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**INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
REPORT**

**AVAAZ
Nepal Emergency Response
2015-16 Project**

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Acknowledgements

We would like to acknowledge the Abari team for their professional support during field consultation as well at a consultation meeting with district level stakeholders. We are particularly grateful to the Avaaz team for their feedback on and suggestions about our conceptual framework and evaluation methods.

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Last but not least, our thanks go to Avaaz who entrusted us with the task of conducting this evaluation.

Thanks.

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List of acronyms

CBO	Community-based organization
CDMC	Community disaster management committee
CGI	Corrugated galvanized sheet
DDC	District development committee
DDRC	District disaster relief committee
DEO	District education office
DoE	Department of Education
DPAC	District project advisory committee
DUDBC	Department of Urban Development and Building Construction
FGD	Focus group discussion
GoN	Government of Nepal
KII	Key informant interview
MoA	Memorandum of agreement
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NFI	Non-food item
ODR	Owner-driven reconstruction
PDNA	Post Disaster Need Assessment
PTA	Parent-teacher association
SIP	School improvement plan
SMC	School management committee
VDC	Village development committee
WASH	Water and sanitation, hygiene
WCF	Ward citizen forum

Executive summary

This report provides the findings of the evaluation team commissioned by Avaaz for its “Earthquake Response Project 2015” and “Earthquake Recovery Project 2015”. The earthquake claimed 8,790 lives and injured 22,300 people in 57 of the nation’s 75 districts, 1,120 village development committees and 71 municipalities. In addition, the earthquake caused extensive destruction and damage to housing and other infrastructure as well as livelihoods and access to basic services.

Avaaz funded Abari to launch a response project to provide shelter and non-food items to earthquake-affected populations in order to restore the living conditions and dignity of children, women and other most-at-risk populations. Abari received the first payment (USD 150,000) from Avaaz, in May 2015 to alleviate the suffering of earthquake-affected communities and support emergency response efforts in the form of food items, and non-food items (NFIs), including shelter (earthquake response project). Abari then created a Foundation in order to work more easily on the ground with government and the second payment was made to Abari Foundation. These two entities here-in-after are referred simply as "Abari". Abari received second payment (USD 200,000) to provide long-term shelter solutions for communities in Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts (earthquake recovery project), where 85% of the houses were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. Abari and its multiple partners worked in remote and isolated VDCs of earthquake affected districts and assisted the most vulnerable and resource poor people.

The overall goal of both earthquake response project and earthquake recovery project was to mitigate suffering and build schools while simultaneously training local people in Abari’s building methods so that they would gain the skills they needed to replicate the techniques as they rebuilt their own homes and community structures, including schools. The evaluation aims were (i) to assess the extent to which the Avaaz funded programs as a whole delivered the anticipated objectives, including its direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, and primary and secondary effects; (ii) to evaluate the effectiveness of services, including disaster-resilient shelters, temporary, and semi-permanent housing, training, and tents for medical camps in the most affected areas and the rebuilding of the three schools in Kavre; and (iii) to evaluate financial efficiency and accountability and the effective use of funds through a thorough review of financial documents, comparison with industry averages for the main activities, review of the quality of goods and services, and information collected within communities.

The following sources of information were utilized: document review; visual evidence; meetings with Abari and multiple partners, project and administrative staff, consultation with government officials, field visits to seven districts where 9 FGDs with males, 5 FGDs with females, 24 KIIs and 14 competency analyses (strength, weakness, opportunities and threats) were conducted. A total of 66 males and 57 females were interviewed as part of the household interviews. Evaluation team also reviewed media coverage, minutes of meetings, and financial documents and tallied them with field data; assessed the internal control and quality assurance system; assessed the scale of transparency and accountability to beneficiaries, donors, and the government and the community complaint mechanism; and evaluated the anti-corruption strategy through assessing supplier qualification, procurement, inventory management, bills and vouchers and other similar matters.

Overall, the evaluation team found both the earthquake response and recovery projects to be highly relevant, timely and effective. The response scores especially highly on strategic factors. This includes maintaining strong relationships with the government, and other stakeholders, maintaining high neutrality and a needs-based focus, delivering programs which succeeded in saving lives, ensuring early recovery and reducing future risks and gaining the high approval and trust of affected communities. The main areas for improvement identified through the evaluation process were at the operational detail level, which can help improve the quality of Abari's future programs even further, and improve overall preparedness for future disasters.

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Nepal Emergency Response 2015-16 Project

I. Background

I.1 Overview of the project

Nepal is the 11th most vulnerable country to earthquake hazards in the world. On 25 April, 2015, Nepal was struck by the most recent major earthquake, one measuring a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale. On 12 May, 2015, a major aftershock, measuring 7.3 on the same scale, terrified the population and caused yet more significant losses of life and property. Aftershocks have continued to strike, causing further damage and panic. According to data from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), the earthquake claimed 8,790 lives and injured 22,300 people in 57 of the nation's 75 districts, 1,120 village development committees (VDCs) and 71 municipalities (MoHA, 2015). The total economic loss was NPR eighty million. Many of the hardest-hit areas are rural, and some of them are remote and difficult to reach, whether because of landslides or damaged and blocked access routes.

Fourteen districts¹ are considered to be the hardest hit in the nation. In addition to loss of life and human suffering, the quakes have caused extensive destruction and damage to housing and other infrastructure as well as to lifelines and livelihoods, leading to drastic reductions in living conditions, income, and access to basic services. More than 1.2 million families (around 6 million people) were affected directly by the quakes (PDNA, 2015). Several key government buildings were seriously damaged and some crumbled to the ground.

I.2 Operational context

Based on the findings of the rapid needs assessment² during response and recovery phase conducted by the Government of Nepal (GoN), AVAAZ funded Abari³ to launch a response project to provide

¹The fourteen Categories A districts are Gorkha, Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Lalitpur, Sindhupalchowk, Ramechhap, Dolakha, Nuwakot, Dhading, Rasuwa, Sindhuli, Okhaldhunga, Makwanpur, and Kavrepalanchowk. The nine Category B districts are Sangja, Chitwan, Kaski, Tanahu, Khotang, Solukhumbu, Udayapur, Bhojpur and Lumjung.

²Kavre was one of the 14 earthquake affected districts. It lies adjacent to Dolakha and Sindhupalchok, which were the epicenter of the second aftershock of May 12th 2015. Most of the earthquake relief works were directed to these districts while Kavre was overlooked by different organizations because it is relatively closer to Kathmandu. It was like darkness under the lamp. Abari choose Kavre, because it has already built couple of buildings in the region and were familiar with the terrain and the community. The building it had previously built, using earth and bamboo, had survived the earthquake, therefore there was good trust in the community for their work and the philosophy. This made it easier to mobilize the community and get early adopters on board to build the first homes and schools. When Abari first chose the demonstration house, it asked the local co-operative to find the most affected families who could not build on his/her own. The local cooperative at Bhattedanda, after having their monthly meeting decided that the help should go to Ms Sanu Maya, who had lost her home in the earthquake. She was chosen because she is a single mother of two children one of whom is disabled. Similarly, when Abari was choosing the schools, it first went to Department of Education (DOE) for the approval of design that was appropriate for 3-4 classroom blocks in the mountain regions (as the earthquake had cause damaged mostly in these terrains). After lots of iterations, lab tests and rigorous structural analysis Abari design was finally approved. After the DOE had approved the design, ABARI went to District Education Office (DEO) in Dhulikhel, Kavre in order to get recommendation for schools, which needed to be rebuilt. Abari had requested for areas that did not have road access, had no outside help, had predominance of minority ethnic groups and had most dire needs for school. More than 2 dozens such schools were suggested. Abari's team then went to each individual school and made an independent verification. All three schools, Karthari, Saraswati and Janajyoti were chosen based on above given requirements. Although they were far from one another and were very remote, they had very pressing needs. For example, young students in Janajyoti were studying out in the open, while some of the classes in Saraswati and Karthari were abandoned because of lack of proper space. Moreover, the school management committee was very eager to use alternative building techniques and they offered free land for the construction.

³Abari was established as a for-profit social enterprise in 2014. Since then, it has been building private homes, community buildings, public schools, guesthouses and furniture using local resources for various private clients. After the 2015, earthquake however, there was a big demand to ABARI style construction for local homes and public schools because it appropriated local

shelter and non-food items (NFI) relief to earthquake-affected populations, particularly those living in Gorkha and Lamjung districts, where 70-90% of the population was affected. The project provided the most vulnerable families with shelter and NFI kits in order to restore the living conditions and dignity of children, women and other most-at-risk populations.

Abari received the first payment from Avaaz in May 2015 to alleviate the suffering of earthquake-affected communities. The first payment (USD 150,000) was granted to support emergency response efforts in the form of food items, and non-food items (NFIs), including shelter (earthquake response project). Money was sent to build tents for medical camps and temporary accommodation in Gorkha, Lamjung and other districts. Abari then created a Foundation in order to work more easily on the ground with government and the second payment was made to Abari Foundation. These two entities here-in-after are referred simply as "Abari". The second payment (USD 200,000) was granted to provide long-term shelter solutions for communities in Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts (earthquake recovery project), where 85% of the houses were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable. This money is being used to rehabilitate and reconstruct permanent structures and short-term habitations for people in need as well as to rebuild three schools in three pilot villages in Kavre.

The overall goal of both earthquake response project and earthquake recovery project was to mitigate suffering and build schools while simultaneously training local people in Abari's building methods so that they would gain the skills they needed to replicate the techniques as they rebuilt their own homes and community structures, including schools. The trainings emphasized the use of locally sourced, salvaged, and culturally appropriate materials to build earthquake-resilient and thermally comfortable structures. It aimed to train 620+ households, create 290 apprentices, and build 30 entrepreneurs.

2. Background to Evaluation

2.1 Objectives of the evaluation

Now that both projects have been completed, an independent evaluation was conducted into the project's overall achievements, key outcomes and impacts in order to make concrete recommendations for similar project in the future.

The specific objectives of the evaluation were as follows.

1. To assess the extent to which the Avaaz programs as a whole delivered the anticipated objectives, including its direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, and primary and secondary effects;
2. To evaluate the effectiveness of services, including disaster-resilient shelters, temporary, and semi-permanent housing, training, and tents for medical camps in the most affected areas and the rebuilding of the three schools in Kavre; and
3. To evaluate financial efficiency and accountability and the effective use of funds through a thorough review of financial documents, comparison with industry averages for the main activities, review of the quality of goods and services, and information collected within communities.


resources and traditional skills and were much more economical and environmentally sustainable. Building public schools and homes require external funding and grants, which has to go through lots of government regulations. In order to comply with the government regulation, including Association Registration Act 1983, which mandates NGOs formed for a social project, Abari Foundation as a profit non-distributing entity was formed.

2.2 Approach and methods of evaluation

In summary, this evaluation was initiated after a review of project documents. Based on this review and to meet the requirement of the ToR, an inception report prepared which described the tools to be used and the checklist to be administrated. To grasp more personal and detailed opinions about transitional shelter/schools, model house for demonstration as well as permanent homes and schools, a total of 14 FGDs, 25 KIs and 14 competency analyses (SWOT) were conducted. In order to receive quantitative information, one-to-one household interviews were also carried out with a randomly selected 66 males and 57 females of Gorkha, Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts based on the agreed template. The primary, secondary, qualitative and quantitative data collected using different tools and techniques were then tabulated, synthesized, and analyzed before arriving at conclusions. Information collected from various sources was analyzed thematically using the ‘content analysis technique’.

Based on the review and to meet the requirement of the terms of reference, the evaluation team prepared an inception report which described the tools it would use and the checklists it would administer to capture the views of project stakeholders and beneficiaries. This checklist and guiding questions were shared with Avaaz and Abari, which then helped to fine-tune them.

The evaluation approach and methods included six steps (Figure 1), namely, (i) mobilization, (ii) desk study, (iii) instrument design, (iv) empirical fieldwork, (v) data analysis and interpretation, and (vi) report writing and finalization.



This assessment used both qualitative and quantitative methods. The evaluation team thoroughly reviewed project agreements; progress, field visit, and monitoring reports, situation reports; case studies; and media coverage. It also assessed all the reports of all internal and external needs assessments and reviews done by Abari and multiple partners. The outcomes of capacity-building activities, a financial summary of how Abari and its multiple partners spent funds each month after the start of operations, the minutes of meetings related to project, a summary of the project (target vs. achievements), a summary of non-Avaaz funding (co-or-parallel financing) and activities for creating synergy were also reviewed to understand the project in greater depth. The evaluation team also reviewed financial documents at Abari’s headquarters in Kathmandu and tallied them with field data; assessed the internal control and quality assurance system (compliance, monitoring, audits, and the like); assessed the scale of transparency and accountability to beneficiaries, donors, the government, and local civil society and the community complaint mechanism; and evaluated the anti-corruption strategy through assessing supplier qualification, procurement, inventory management, bills and receipt, supply of substandard goods and services, and other similar matters.

At the central level, the evaluation team consulted with representatives of the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC), Department of Education (DoE), Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), and MoHA. The team also interacted with representatives of ActionAid Nepal and the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA). Meetings with representatives of Learning Planet, BELIEVERS, BASS, Tents for Nepal, Karmi Initiatives, People in Need, and Kamala Foundation were also done as was a meeting with auditors before fieldwork. The auditors helped identify key financial issues and compare financial expenses against available bills and receipts.

To collect more information as well as to verify and triangulate the data collected from other sources, KIIs were held with VDC secretaries; members of ward citizen forums, leaders of community-based organizations (CBOs) and youth clubs; teachers; and representatives of political parties in the field. Social workers, psycho-social counselors, health post staff, and female community health volunteers were also chosen as key informants as they were able to supply much rich information about the project and its impacts at the individual and family levels. To garner the perspectives of institutions, key officials at humanitarian agencies, the UN, and government offices as well as district disaster relief committee (DDRC) members, NGOs and INGOs representatives, and the NGO federation were also consulted in the field. The process of identifying the needs of the targeted families while taking into account the specific constraints of the context of intervention was also explored during interview.

The views of project staff were another important source of information. Meetings were carried out with the program, support, technical, logistics, and management staff of Abari and the field staff of its partner agencies. Consultations with project staff before the fieldwork helped a lot in enabling the evaluation team to internalize the key issues and concerns related to project.

Qualitative information was collected using participatory tools and techniques like focus group discussions (FGDs); key informant interviews (KIIs), competency analysis, observation, participatory case studies, site visits and walks, and audio-visual images. In order to acquire personal and detailed opinions about shelter and NFI kits, a total of 14 FGDs, 24 KIIs, and 14 competency analyses were conducted in Gorkha, Dhading, Chitwan, Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts. In Nuwakot, relevant information was derived from district stakeholders remotely (through telephone calls). FGDs were conducted with a variety of direct project beneficiaries and members of community-based and people's organizations, SMCs, and PTAs but focused on the women, people with disabilities (PwD), older people, and children of the targeted families. To guarantee that women's opinions would be represented, separate FGDs were held with women, men, and children. Some of the issues covered during FGDs include the effectiveness of the modalities of the process of selecting beneficiaries, the shelter and NFI package and materials, the participation of women in the project, and the impacts of shelter and NFI kits on households and communities. Family visits and observations were another important tool for collecting opinions and assessing the quick impact of project support (shelter and NFI kits).

Competency analyses helped identify the strengths and weaknesses of the relief distribution process and approach. The evaluation team directly observed settlement sites and inspected temporary shelters (tent houses), tool kits, fixing materials, and NFI kits (blankets, mattresses, etc). While selecting respondents for consultation, gender and various social distinctions were taken into consideration in order to get a representative view from multiple perspectives. The evaluation team also collected visual evidence (in the form of the existing collection of pictures and videos and pre- and post- interventions, like repaired transitional shelters and schools, permanent home, a model village and permanent model school, trainings, relief distribution, interviews with beneficiaries, groups, and other stakeholders among other sources.

As part of empirical fieldwork, evaluation team visited Durbar High School, Bal Mandir, Chuchhepati camps, and Sankhu and observed the impacts of relief support in the form of tents and bamboo yurts. A meeting with technicians at Ramnagar, Chitwan District, provided insight into the bamboo processing process and the benefits of training locals in building bamboo tent and yurts. The team interacted with the communities of Balimtar, Gorkha District, to learn about the overall benefits of the relief support received right after the earthquake. The team observed the vocational blocks of Saraswati Secondary School, Janajyoti Primary School, and Karthari School in Kavre District and interacted with school management committees (SMCs) and parent-teacher associations (PTAs). The team also travelled to Bhattedanda of Kavre District and visited Sanu Maya Tamang and other community members about the benefits of a model house, brick-making machines, a rammed earth framework, and mud pulverizes. Visits to Chitre, Kiwool and Gaithum of Sindhupalchok District helped the evaluation team to understand the key benefits of transitional homes and shelters through interaction with homeowners

and school teachers. The sampled VDC and community groups were selected using purposive sampling methods.

In order to receive quantitative information, one-to-one household interviews were also carried out with a randomly selected 66 males and 57 females of Gorkha, Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts based on the agreed template.

The primary, secondary, qualitative and quantitative data collected using different tools and techniques were then tabulated, synthesized, and analyzed before arriving at conclusions. Information collected from various sources was analyzed thematically using the 'content analysis technique'⁴. A draft report was shared with Avaaz in the agreed format and the report was finalized after incorporating feedback and suggestions. This report draws key findings and makes operational recommendations for improvements in and strategies for future operations.

2.3 Limitations

The evaluation process was learning-oriented: during it, stakeholders were provided opportunities to express their views, opinions, grievances, and learning in a transparent way. Despite good preparation, however, the evaluation did not always go smoothly. First, the majority of the displaced people who received relief services during the emergency had already returned to their native villages, so the evaluators were not able to interact with the full range of relief recipients. That said, a few families were interviewed in their temporary shelters and others in their homes. Second, the majority of government officials who were working in the districts of Gorkha, Dhading, Kavre and Sindhupalchok at the time of the earthquakes had already been transferred to other districts. For this reason, it was difficult to get a clear picture about the level of coordination and collaboration among the agencies even after the team had interacted with the few hold-over and the new officials. Third, as the response finished in September 2015 and the evaluation was conducted 15 months later, it was difficult to interact with the project's partners. Despite these limitations, the evaluators interacted with a sufficient representation of the relevant stakeholders in the course of the field work, and arrived at well-validated findings.

3. Evaluation findings and analysis

The evaluation team conducted a thorough review using three evaluation goals. The analysis is based on FGDs, KIIs and household survey. Overall, both projects resulted in many positive outcomes..

3.1 Evaluation objective I (To assess the extent to which AVAAZ funded projects as a whole delivered the anticipated objectives indicated in the proposal, including the direct and indirect, positive and negative, intended and unintended, and primary and secondary effects)

Q1.1: What are the overall outputs (target vs. achievement), key outcome of AVAAZ funded interventions particularly (i) Post EQ Relief, (ii) Transitional schools, (iii) Transitional Shelters, (iv) Model home, (v) Permanent Homes, and (vi) Permanent Model School?

Major outcomes of earthquake-response project

Abari project's records and independent verification of the specific figures during field work reveal that earthquake-response project provided more than 3,000 families in Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchok, and Kathmandu districts immediate relief materials, including sleeping bags, blankets, and rice and provided another 88,825 families with tarpaulin sheets or tents. It also supported the construction of 55 community shelters, 1,600 transitional shelters, two health posts, and 67 transitional schools in Bhaktapur, Dhading, Nuwakot, and Rasuwa districts. Stakeholders said that relief materials were distributed in the presence of local police, DDRC members, and VDC officials, and that there were no

⁴ This is the technique usually used to analyze qualitative data.

major difficulties, just a few minor disputes between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Though local stakeholders were involved, the emergence of conflict, however trivial, suggests that still more community involvement is warranted (refer annex-1, table 3, 4 and 10).

a. Outcomes of post-earthquake relief: The evaluation consultations revealed that earthquake-affected families were able to mitigate their suffering by using the relief items Abari provided. Earthquake-affected families received tents, canvas, and other shelter-related materials like plastic sheets and bamboo as well as materials to construct transitional schools. The majority of beneficiary families expressed their satisfaction with the response; they said that the quality of relief materials and services Abari provided helped mitigate their suffering.

b. Outcomes of transitional shelters: The support Abari provided for transitional shelters was crucial during the initial days as it ensured people's security, personal safety, and dignity and protected them from the harsh climate. Though affected families had diverse needs, including food, shelter, health, education, protection, and livelihoods, shelter was their top priority. Abari's support for durable shelter solutions were highly appreciated by government agencies because they enabled people to leave unsafe conditions.

As the government's immediate support for building materials, particularly CGI sheets, was, at just NPR 15,000 (USD 150) insufficient, Abari promoted transitional shelters with flexible and diverse designs that encourage house-owners to use its 'do-it-yourself manual' to build transitional shelters using materials salvaged from destroyed homes. By the end of 2015, Abari had supported the construction of more than 200 transitional shelters in Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts. Abari barefoot technicians visited remote villages of Sindhupalchowk and Kavre districts and provided on-the-job training to villages that had no access to trained technicians. In Kiwool and Chitre villages of Sindhupalchok, Abari supported the construction of 1,600 transitional shelters in partnership with ActionAid Nepal.

After June 2015, the point at which the government declared that the emergency relief phase was over, it was difficult to support more families by providing relief items, so Abari switched its focus from emergency relief to support for transitional shelters and schools in order to address the needs and aspirations of earthquake-affected families. English and Nepali design manuals were developed in easy-to-understand language and distributed free of charge through various platforms and social media. New homes were constructed using the technology and information disseminated through Abari. It is estimated that more than 6 million people referred to these manuals and still the demands are high.

Consultation revealed that people trusted Abari's advice about making transitional shelters because the designs made use of local materials like stones, bricks, wood, and bamboo. These models called for using doors and windows from damaged homes and making walls of thatch or bamboo weave. Abari's emphasis on community-driven reconstruction using local resources and salvageable materials is highly commendable.

The project spent much time and energy acquiring good-quality materials from good companies. Participants in FGDs in Kavre opined that the shelters kits distributed to the communities were of high quality. The Abari-supported shelters constructed between June 2015 and October 2015 are still in use and still in good condition. About 10% of those transitional shelters were converted into animal sheds or sheds for storing firewood or grains after permanent homes were constructed. It was good to see that shelter kits were distributed unconditionally. People confirmed that the shelters provided lifesaving assistance and reduced the vulnerability of displaced populations. They also praised the fact that transitional shelters were provided when they were highly crucial.

c. Outcomes of transitional schools: The evaluation found that the transitional schools are highly relevant because more than 40,000 schools were damaged and, considering the pace of current development, it is very likely that they will not be rebuilt in the next few years. Abari's construction of health posts, maternity wards, multiple grain storage facilities, and police stations was also highly relevant.

ABARI provided high quality tents according to the local demands and needs. They were multi-purpose tents which were pretty big in size -30ft by 30ft and 24ft by 30 ft-they were used in whatever functions the communities felt necessary. Some communities used it for schools but through local partners they were also used in other urgent needs as health post, maternity wards, multiple grain storage and even police stations. The canvas materials for the tents were brought in from India, where as the frames and floorings were done using locally available materials.

In Gorkha, Kathmandu and Kavre districts, Abari installed more than 200 transitional schools. During the fieldwork, more than 32 such transitional schools were observed and interacted with school administrators about the overall benefits from such support and prepared a spacious and wind-resistant shelter with both cool and bright inside. Although the destruction was devastating, the children of Gorkha and Sindhupalchock districts were back in transitional schools just three weeks after the earthquake.

Abari also addressed GoN's request and erected transitional shelters and yurts in the grounds of old and prestigious schools like Durbar High School and Bal Mandir in Kathmandu and Kathmandu University in Dhulikhel, Kavre. Stakeholders greatly admired this technology because bamboo-and-canvas yurts are airy, lightweight, and durable, even in the most adverse of weather. Yurts constructed in the grounds of schools, health posts and monasteries are used for social gatherings. In many locations, for example, in Durbar High School, yurts acted as temporary learning centers and child-friendly safe spaces.

In order to systematize the construction work, Abari apprenticed 300 students and masons in earthquake safe construction. Its barefoot technicians built over 200 transitional schools in Gorkha, Kathmandu, and Kavre districts to achieve a sense of normalcy. As the technologies it endorsed are very simple and use locally available resources and skills, transitional schools were constructed with minimal financial resources.

As the scale of physical devastation at schools was great, children were terribly frightened. They were reluctant to go school because they feared that there would be another earthquake. Teachers in Gorkha confirmed that when transitional schools were erected, children were able to continue their education in a safe environment. Students' motivation increased when Abari provided them with basic furniture and school supplies. Informal consultations with schoolchildren revealed that these facilities helped build psycho-social confidence. Abari also constructed a health camp at 3000 meter above sea level in Gorkha. People greatly admired the well-designed, portable and spacious medical tents.

d. Outcomes of permanent model homes for demonstration: In order to build people's trust, Abari designed and distributed concepts for building two ideal post-earthquake model villages, one each in Bhattedanda, Kavre, and Gaithum, Sindhupalchock. It constructed one model house in Bhattedanda for the purpose of demonstration. Many interested people have visited it and gotten ideas about how to build their own houses. This building opened avenues for starting 200 permanent homes using local technologies modified as needed. The rationale behind model homes was to demonstrate improved earthen construction techniques and pique the curiosity of villagers after the earthquake shook their faith in local materials.

Major outcomes of the earthquake-recovery project

a. Outcomes of permanent homes: In order to support the construction of permanent school, Abari released eight open-source designs for permanent homes, all of which were approved by the National Reconstruction Authority, DUDBC and DoE; and trained more than 100 artisans and engineers. It trained more than 350 local people to build sustainable and affordable homes on their own using locally available materials. In case of home construction, each of the individual house-owner has to obtain approval from concerned municipality.

People's trust in Abari's designs for earthquake-resistant buildings was considerable because two buildings it had constructed before the earthquake in Kavre and Gorkha withstood the impact of the earthquake. The open-source designs and construction manual were a significant help in supporting people to build their own homes. One huge achievement is that Abari's designs were going to be included in government's upcoming manual for designs.

Consultations with stakeholders and Abari staff stated that 11% of the budget for Abari's open-source designs is spent on foreign materials like concrete and steel and that the remaining 89% is spent on local labor and materials. As their models promote local craftsmanship and are thermally comfortable, their benefits are numerous. One advantage people identified was that they can make bricks by themselves using a locally available brick-making machine. Designs are flexible enough that they can be adjusted to suit the topography of each individual site.

Local people were provided technical knowledge, vocational training, machinery, and equipment in addition to some material support. Abari took responsibility for giving them technical support, supervising construction, and providing designs for hazard-resistant buildings. It also linked people with trained masons and artisans as well as local microfinance institutions. Abari informed beneficiaries about testing soil, locating suitable sites and making bricks so they could construct their own permanent homes. Permanent homes give people privacy and protection. During the FGDs in Kiwool, Sindhupalchock, people said:

"For the first time in our lives, we experienced the multiple stresses and trauma caused by homelessness. Being homeless reduced us to a hand-to-mouth living. In addition, as we had no house, our children wandered here and there and there was a risk of violence against them. Our worry for them exacerbated our stress. Now we have a house, so we can house all our family members, assign tasks to them, and even welcome our relatives and friends. We now realize that houses provide invaluable privacy and protection."

FGD in Kiwool, Sindhupalchock, Jan 18, 2017

b. Outcomes of permanent schools: Once the manual on designs and typologies was ready, Abari began to advocate for the use of "owner-driven reconstruction (ODR⁵)" among relevant stakeholders and agencies. Once the design for a permanent school was approved by the government, Abari started to build three schools in Kavre. Though progress in the major interventions of the recovery phase was satisfactory, there were some delays in getting the designs approved from Kavre district education office (DEO). The design of the schools was commendable: there was a multi-functional play space in between classroom blocks as well as a covered play space, an art center, and a small theatre that also served as a communal space. Having a covered play space will allow children to move and play regardless of how hot or cold or otherwise inclement the weather is. Inspired by the good quality of Abari's design and work, more than 6 other schools in Kavre (in Timal are four schools and in Bansbari area-two school) also replicated the same technology (refer annex-I, table I).

For the first time, the Nepali government approved a bamboo-and-earth design for a school building. Despite all these achievements, some challenges remain. Compared to the benefits of other interventions, efforts at livelihood enhancement are still weak and very few people have benefitted from brick-making tools and agro-based trainings. Though schools are going to be centers of excellence in terms of physical facilities, neither the design nor the estimate included WASH facilities and there might well be resource constraints preventing the construction of water and toilet facilities. In addition, if schools do not have sufficient water, their sanitation and drainage systems will be poor. Steep land nearby poses some risks of landslides at Janajyoti Primary and Saraswoti Secondary schools. In addition, children would be at great risk if proper fences did not circle school grounds. The road that joins Saraswoti Secondary School to the main road needs to be improved. However, it is good to see that

⁵ODR a participatory model which places homeowners at the center of reconstruction. The model integrates the homeowner's decisions about home design and site selection with building techniques tailored to local environments and resilient to environmental hazards.

Abari has corrected these issues to reduce the future physical risks. Thanks to Abari’s social mobilization approach, each of the schools has established an operation and maintenance fund.

Q 1.2: Were the interventions and outputs of the program consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives and outcomes?

Both projects achieved their anticipated objectives effectively. Abari was successful in delivering good-quality services which met the project’s objectives. The projects were effective because they were flexible enough to address evolving needs and to coordinate meaningfully with government and humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and CBOs. The projects’ results are summarized in the following section.

Both projects were designed to fulfill three interrelated objectives: (i) save lives, (ii) facilitate early recovery, and (iii) reduce future risks. Careful review of project documents and consultations with the Abari team and district-level stakeholders revealed that the overall goals and objectives of both projects were fulfilled. The vast majority of project activities visited by the evaluation team were consistent with one or more of these overall goals and objectives.

For example, in the relief phase, Abari distributed NFI packages which helped save lives. It also diversified their relief packages to suit people’s needs and to accommodate the recommendations of clusters. Abari also linked earthquake-affected families with other humanitarian agencies working in the projects’ districts so they could claim relief items (food, NFIs, water and sanitation hygiene-WASH, and immediate livelihood services for early recovery).

Earthquake-affected families were able to mitigate their suffering through the timely receipt of adequate services from Abari. While supporting the affected families with immediate relief, including transitional schools and homes, Abari also prepared different designs and manuals for different types of buildings that could be used during early recovery. The major factors influencing the achievement of the objectives and outcomes are (i) good coordination with government agencies and project’s stakeholders, (ii) high visibility of Abari’s good designs, and (iii) transparency in plans, mandates and budget.

Q 1.3: What was the outcome (both intended & unintended, positive & negative) in saving and protecting lives, assisting people towards longer-term recovery and reducing future vulnerability?

During the recovery phase, earthquake-affected families received support for building permanent homes and schools in which to live safely and run livelihood activities. Abari supported the construction of permanent model houses, permanent homes, and permanent schools, all of which reduced risks. Its collaboration with district-based government agencies and DDRCs right from the beginning of the project helped to build the confidence of affected families and their ability to collaborate with and link to such agencies, thereby reducing future risks.

The survey results revealed that Abari was highly successful in meeting its three objectives. About 94% of respondents declared that the materials and services they received immediately after the earthquake helped save lives, 79% opined that support was beneficial for long-term recovery, and 87% said support was instrumental in reducing future disaster risks.

Key question	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Did the services and relief materials help save lives in your household?	96	92	94
Did the services and relief materials help bring about long-term recovery in your household?	89	70	79
Did the services and relief materials reduce future risks for your household?	92	82	87

Source: Household survey, 2017

The majority of FGD participants also confirmed that the services and relief materials that they had received from Abari helped save lives and brought about long-term recovery. Abari and its multiple partner were successful in leveraging additional funding to address shelter needs by providing shelter materials and technical assistance, thereby enabling affected households to ‘build-back-better’ and increase their resilience to future disaster risks. In one FGD in Gorkha, people had this to say about the benefits of transitional shelters:

“... We cannot explain the situation immediately after the earthquake. As the majority of our houses were damaged by the earthquake, we felt utterly abandoned. Some took shelter under big trees and other at the edge of the road. It was almost impossible to get formal loans at low interest rates to repair and maintain our houses. Thanks to Abari, we got transitional shelters to live in. This is the first time we have ever received so much relief. Earlier, we had received only instant noodles and beaten rice. We would not have been able to buy CGI sheets, tools, and binding materials or to pay for skilled labor to build our shelters ourselves. Abari’s approach saved us from the vicious circle of indebtedness. We are proud that we now have a basic shelter. To be frank, it was a time for basic survival. Thank God we didn’t have to sleep in an open space. The shelters also helped adolescent girls maintain their privacy and dignity....”
FGD with local communities at Balimtar, Gorkha, January 12, 2017

Despite such effective support from Abari, the response and recovery phases were not free from hindrances and challenges. Some of the challenges faced by the projects were (i) physical hardships as a result of remoteness, (ii) the rainy season and the resultant blockade of rural roads for several days, a situation which made it difficult to transport the relief and construction materials, (iii) the lack of clarity in some government policies, especially with respect to permanent housing and schools, (iv) the non-friendly attitude of the government towards NGOs, which was reflected in delays in getting approval, (v) the blockade at the Indian border, which severely affected the availability of critical supplies and led to high inflation, and (vi) the high turnover of government officials, a fact leading to poor institutional memory.

Intended outcomes

a. Fostering privacy and dignity

Following the earthquake, many affected families lived in others’ houses. Women of Balimtar, Gorkha, and Kiwool, Sindhupalchok, said that sharing a house made them feel that they were an imposition on their relatives or neighbors and that living in tents and not owning a house meant a loss in social status. They felt that they lived like beggars. The provision of transitional shelters and later permanent homes helped mitigate these feelings and thereby promoted self-dignity. Having adequate housing also protected them from adverse climatic conditions and reduced the immediate risk to life. The people of Kafalgedi of Kavre, said that such services helped them increase personal safety and maintain privacy and dignity. In their new shelters, people were able to sleep safely, accommodate less fortunate extended family members, and reduce the risks of sexual violence and trafficking. There was no evidence that women and girls were exploited during the emergency, though it is generally common to find such abuses after disasters. Housing services make life easier; promoted health, hygiene, and sanitation; and secured the right to live in security, privacy, and dignity. Not all needy families received shelter support, however, as resources were limited.

b. Increase in confidence and self-esteem of affected families

The good management of relief (NFIs and shelter kits) maintained the confidence and self-esteem of all beneficiaries, particularly children, women, persons with disabilities, and the elderly. Relief helped reduce people’s trauma by lifting their spirits and increasing their self-esteem and confidence. The projects’ assistance in constructing transitional shelters and schools helped reduce the psychological trauma of families and encouraged children to study effectively.

c. Running livelihood enterprises at home

Houses made up of bamboo and salvaged materials have a minimally adverse impact on forest resources and the environment but made an important economic impact on the lives of affected families: they served as home-based enterprises in which people, especially women, set up economic activities like weaving sweaters and carpets and running other small-scale enterprises. Women and children said they were living better lives than pre-earthquake because the project had successfully responded to their immediate needs and aspiration.

d. Reduction in human suffering and links to long-term development

Abari not only linked families with services but it also oriented affected families to the procedures involved in accessing government services. Both these activities helped reduce suffering. Now people are aware of their rights and entitlements and know that getting support from the government and other duty bearers is their right and not just a matter of 'charity'. The projects also reduced human suffering because they provided the right services and made the right efforts to link relief and recovery interventions to development.

Unintended outcomes

a. Replicating the projects generated good practices and technologies

One of the outcomes of the Abari-implemented projects is that some interventions have been replicated by other agencies in and around the project's communities and districts. For example, exception for a minor modification of roofing material, the design for transitional schools was replicated in Chuchhepati, Chabahil, Kathmandu. Except for a change in wall materials, the model of transitional shelters was replicated by ActionAid Nepal in Chitre, Kiwool and Gaithum area of Sindhupalchok District. In Panchkhal areas of Kavre, Habitat for Humanity replicated Abari's permanent house model. Similarly, Abari's permanent model school is being replicated by Hands with Hands in Gaithum of Sindhupalchok, where it supported for two model houses, by INBAR in Kathmandu University of Kavre, and by Ratamate Youth Club in Ratamate village of Nuwakot. Information received from FGDs and KIIs also revealed that such scale-up is increasing. As Abari's designs are low-cost and local knowledge-based and does not have high operation-and-maintenance costs, people's interest in them is great. Although these are positive steps, district-based agencies are not fully replicating Abari's model designs in their plans and programs (refer annex-I, table 9).

b. Agencies have interest to adhere to Abari's designs

Abari adhered to the standard design of the DOE and to the designs approved by the DUDBC for earthquake-resistant homes and schools. Because Abari's design followed the government-approved design, there was no controversy regarding the shape or size of schools or homes. Abari's model designs are likely to continue to be used by many district-based and government and non-government agencies. Stakeholders said that the visibility of Abari's models among the constructions sponsored by government and humanitarian agencies had increased. Humanitarian agencies have been keenly interested, motivated, and willing to collaborate with Abari to use its eco-friendly house design. Such connections will help sustain Abari's intervention during the recovery phase. Such a high degree of coordination and collaboration did help promote Abari's long-term sustainability.

c. Increased understanding of rights and entitlements

The project was successful in fostering empowerment, ensuring equal participation, and consolidating the voices of rights holders to claim rights and entitlements. There is a good rapport between rights holders and duty bearers. As a result, rights holders have begun to get funds from governments' fiscal budgets for recovery- and reconstruction-related initiatives. For example, the people of Karthari and Pachkhal of Kavre and Gailthum of Sindhupalchok claimed that the projects' orientation had taught them where government resources are and how to claim them. Rights holders are now more vocal and confident than they used to be; they have developed a "we can do" attitude. Consultation with communities and school administrations revealed that they know more than they did about earthquake

preparedness and risk management. Through continuous advocacy, VDC emergency fund was used during emergencies, as is called for in the VDC Grants Guidelines (2011) of Nepal.

d. Leveraging resources from governments

Representatives of district-based agencies in both Kavre and Sindhupalchok districts said that they had allocated budget funds for scaling up Abari's eco-friendly house and schools. All the VDC secretaries interviewed were committed to allocating some money from their VDC regular funds to fund some schools and homes. Now that recovery and reconstruction are well-funded priorities of the government, it is likely that people will be able to get resources from the government. Government stakeholders all displayed a sense of ownership of recovery and reconstruction. Thanks to various capacity-building initiatives, people are confident that they can tackle an emergency of similarly severe scale. The capacity-building initiatives helped change people's mindset about the need to influence and lobby duty bearers in order to leverage resources.

As Abari's model homes and schools are built with low-cost, locally available resources, people's interest in these models is high. Social media was used to effectively disseminate information about these technologies. Abari secured additional resources from other development partners to carry out similar activities but widespread donor fatigue and disillusionment could threaten regular funding. One of the drawbacks of the projects was that little attention was paid to the documentation of good practices and lessons learnt, an activity which could have aided in leveraging resources. The provision of five brick-making machines, five rammed-earth formworks and mud pulverizers helped schools make good-quality bricks and generate income. For example, Janajyoti Primary school of Kavre raised NPR 16,000 per month by renting out these apparatus. Abari's technologies are now on "auto-pilot mode," meaning that they are self-run and self-adopted without support from outsiders. This fact will also ensure the sustainability of Abari's interventions.

3.2 Evaluation Objective 2 (Evaluate the effectiveness of services, including disaster-resilient shelters/semi-permanent housing, trainings, tents for medical camps and temporary accommodation in the most affected areas and rebuilding three schools in three pilot villages in Kavre district)

Q2.1: How the project was successful for the effectiveness of services, including disaster-resilient shelters/semi-permanent housing, trainings, tents for medical camps and temporary accommodation in the most affected areas and rebuilding three schools in three pilot villages in Kavre district?

Abari was successful in delivering services, including disaster-resilient shelters and semi-permanent housing, training, tents for medical camps, and temporary accommodation for the most affected families, as well as rebuilding three schools in three villages in Kavre District. The services were a success because Abari practice participatory processes of planning, implementation, and follow-up. The response of this question is accommodated in other questions.

Q 2.2: What processes ABARI employed for the selection of beneficiaries? Were procedures used for needs identification and targeting appropriate and transparent?

Abari used a variety of criteria to select beneficiary families (refer box-1 below). Additional criteria include damage to thatched houses, destruction of walls, collapse of roofs, ultra-poor families unable to repair and maintain their houses immediately, and families with no income source. In short, families of vulnerable groups with little capacity to rebuild their homes were given first preference. The project's practice of positive discrimination was appreciated by stakeholders at the VDC and district levels. The fact that the selection criteria varied slightly from VDC to VDC indicates that Abari district teams used location-specific indicators to select target families. Consultative meetings were held while selecting families. However, not all women were involved in needs identification and beneficiary selection.

Box-1: Selection process of target families and schools

Selection process of schools

- Application letter to Department of Education (DoE) and get first round approval
- Application to DUDBC for second round approval on structural part
- Receive final approval from DoE
- Application to District Education Office (DEO)
- Submit need assessment and feasibility study report to DEO
- Receive approval from DEO based on the feasibility and need assessment
- Final selection of schools among the approved schools from DEO

Selection criteria/indicators of targeted families

- Families with human casualty
- Families with severely injured people
- Completely damaged houses
- Single women headed households
- Families with people having different forms of disabilities
- Socio-economically excluded groups (dalits and ethnic minorities)
- Families with elderly people (above 70 years)

Using the agreed-upon criteria, ward citizen forums (WCFs) prepared a preliminary list of families needing assistance. That list was later endorsed by VDCs and approved by DDRCs. In project districts, the DDRc provided approved families with 'red cards' which they had to show to get relief packages. There was no dispute during the selection of families for the project's support. The harmoniousness of the selection process was due to its being transparent and participatory.

Believing that a delayed response is as good as no response, the project delivered relief packages as quickly as possible. In general, communities appreciated the selection criteria adopted and the types, quality, and quantity of NFI and shelter kits provided. Beneficiaries clearly voiced their satisfaction with the participatory selection and distribution processes. Some of the stakeholders who participated in FGDs in Kavre said:

"We are proud that we selected the neediest families without much dispute. As our process was participatory and involved local stakeholders, people admired our approach. The clear criteria of Abari helped to eliminate the unfair influence of elites. Though Abari shared its criteria with us to facilitate the selection process, we also used local context-specific criteria to make the final decision. We know our neighbors much better than outsiders do. Neither race, religion, nor political affiliation were used in the selection process."

FGD at Kafalgedi village, Kavre, January 16, 2017

The results from FGDs showed that even though Abari gave much time and energy to the selection process and tried to make it as fair as possible, some vulnerable households were still left out. Selecting just three schools from the many that needed help was very challenging. Abari provided information and involved all sections of the community, explaining to both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, the rationale behind the selection of the most vulnerable schools and thereby secured their support.

According to 90% of the survey respondents, the participatory needs assessment conducted under the leadership of VDC-level stakeholders enabled Abari to address the needs of earthquake-affected people adequately without discrimination on the basis of gender, age, physical ability, or mental ability. More than 97% of respondents said that the services and relief materials the project provided did not cause any unintended harm.

Key question	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
I. Were the needs of people adequately addressed in a dignified manner without discrimination based on gender, age, physical ability, or mental ability?	94	87	90

2. Did any unintended harm result from these help and relief materials your family received?	2	4	3
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Source: Household survey, 2017

Q 2.3: How relevant, appropriate and timely are ABARI's interventions to the needs, expectations and priorities of the affected population?

a. Relevance, appropriateness, and timeliness of Abari's interventions

The evidence collected during the household survey and FGDs revealed that Abari's interventions were highly relevant, appropriate, and timely in addressing the needs, expectations, and priorities of the earthquake-affected population. In the household survey, earthquake-affected families of project's districts expressed a high degree of satisfaction with Abari's projects in terms of the quality, quantity and timeliness of the services they received as reflected in the responses shown below.

Questions	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total(%)
1. Are you satisfied with the quality of services from ABARI?	94	91	92
2. Are you satisfied with the quantity of services from ABARI?	82	74	78
3. Are you satisfied with the timeliness of services and relief materials?	92	88	90

Source: Household survey, 2017

Overall, 92% respondents were satisfied with the quality of services, 78% with the quantity, and 90% with the timeliness. While satisfaction with the quantity of services was slightly lower than with quality and timeliness, it is still very high by industry standards. It is not surprising that this value was lower either: the need was high and the budget limited. The fact that females were less satisfied than men with all aspects of the services can be attributed to the fact that their involvement during the planning and decision-making processes was limited.

The information collected during FGDs provided great insights into people's perceptions about the different services Abari provided. For example, in the relief phase, it provided NFIs including tents, tarpaulins, and household items as well as transitional schools, all items the affected communities desperately needed to build shelters and achieve a semblance of comfort as well as to resume schooling as early as possible. During the recovery phase, the most common interventions were support for the affected communities to construct a model home for demonstration purposes, permanent homes, and permanent schools.

Though satisfaction level was high, a few school administrators in Gorkha and Nuwakot were concerned that the transitional schools were not very durable and that permanent schools needed to be built as soon as possible, but even they appreciated the support provided. People were very happy in part because during the relief phase Abari provided diverse types of relief packages based on people's needs and aspirations.

b. Maintained good correlation between the project's goal and objectives and policy provisions

The projects were appropriate in both the national and international contexts. The objectives, results, and activities formulated correlated well with national policies and the GoN's international commitments.

At the national level, the projects contributed to the Natural Disaster Relief Act (1982), National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (2009), Disaster Rescue and Relief Standards (2005), and National Disaster Response Framework (2013) because their objectives were in line with the mandates and values of these policy documents. The projects fitted nicely within the goals of the Three-Year Interim Plan (2013/14-2015/16) of the GoN, which advocates developing disaster-resilient communities among highly vulnerable disaster-affected populations. At the international level, the projects helped Nepal meet its commitments under the Hyogo Framework of Action (2005-2015), UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, and Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015). The projects also adhered to the key provisions of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (1992) and Post Disaster Need Assessment Report (2015).

c. Addressed the needs and priorities of earthquake-affected people and communities

The evaluation found that the earthquake-affected have many needs (food and NFIs, medical services, psychosocial support, and follow-up) that need to be taken care of timely and appropriately. Since food- and shelter-related needs were severe, the project was only partially able to fulfill them. The selection of NFIs and shelter kits as relief materials was appropriate, too, because the earthquake-affected felt this type of support was their top priority in reducing risk and meeting their basic survival needs. In some project locations like Gaithum and Chitre of Sindhupalchock, people emphasized that shelter kits (like corrugated galvanized sheet-CGI sheets) were more important than NFI kits (tents, blankets, and mattresses). The projects took the appropriate approach of linking people with relevant humanitarian agencies working within the project's district so that they would be able to access food and shelter supports. A mechanism was in place so that the affected population received timely information about appropriate rescue-and-relief services. Interviews with project participants suggest that the services provided by the project did meet their needs. The project reached out to nine of the worst-affected districts through emergency relief and to Kavre and Sindhupalchock districts with support for permanent homes and schools (recovery support).

d. Tailored humanitarian response to meet national and local needs and ensure ownership

The humanitarian response used several methods to ensure ownership at the national and local levels. During the rapid needs assessment phase, meetings were held with government officials, particularly district-level health, education, local development, women's and children's development, and administrative offices as well as with municipal and VDC development offices to address needs and enhance ownership. Rapid initial needs assessments were conducted prior to designing the project and people's needs and priorities were systematically documented. These assessments, which were commissioned by the international humanitarian community, were good quality but since reports were published slowly, the projects were unable to address all their findings. Both projects adopted a multi-pronged approach to working with major stakeholders in order to achieve synergy.

Efforts were made to tailor the humanitarian response to local and national needs and ensure ownership. All programs were designed in a participatory way. Local youths in relief camps were mobilized as volunteers during response phase. These volunteers were quite confident and thoroughly immersed themselves in the community as they carried out response and recovery work.

e. Adhered to international standards and used local resources to systematize the response

The project's outstanding collaboration between government and non-government agencies to avoid duplication and to serve the target population is certainly laudable. Upon deeper evaluation, however, the presence of some bottlenecks cannot be denied. For example, coordination among the humanitarian agencies was shallow and each fought for visibility through unhealthy competition. This rivalry was partly due to the fact that there was no clear role for humanitarian agencies in the initial days of response and agencies were unfamiliar with international standards. When a common standard was adopted, each response institution did its best attempt to meet its targets and succeeded to a large degree. Projects adopted an innovative approach to establishing standards, monitoring compliance, and reporting progress on targets vs. achievements.

f. Conducted a common needs assessment

The approach to assessing needs was highly relevant. Conducting a thorough needs assessment is a very difficult task (often there is a problem of duplication) during an emergency period when preparation for relief work and quick service provision are prioritized, yet the project was able to assess needs rapidly and comprehensively by working in cooperation with other agencies. Needs were reflected well in the response plans and programs. The risks identified during the rapid needs assessment formed the basis for the response design.

The scale of the project's achievement can be attributed to its extremely good modality, one which reached target groups without discrimination. That said, not everyone benefitted. Some women with disabilities lacked services because they had no say in decision-making. Though the projects expended

time, energy, and resources to ensure the response did not discriminate by caste, class, gender, or ethnicity, achieving inclusiveness in the Nepalese society is challenging given how prevalent discriminatory attitudes and behaviors are in rural areas. It is difficult to study the effect of these dynamics on the response activities with the available data. It was said that some Dalits, poor, and marginalized people as well as older people without caretakers could have been left out due to geographical remoteness, poor access to communication, and poor road accessibility.

g. Addressed the unmet needs of the most affected population

Response projects usually follow a ‘blanket approach’ and put all beneficiaries in ‘a single basket’. The needs of vulnerable women, older persons, and persons with disabilities can vary from those of the general population and are oftentimes not addressed by humanitarian agencies during general relief operations. These projects, however, were designed to address the unmet needs of the most affected population and to cover unreached areas and populations. The projects reached out to those sections of the society which had received few benefits or had been excluded from comprehensive and technical relief. Thanks to the project’s innovative approach, even areas that were at very high risk of earthquake aftershocks and prone to great damage were covered.

The blanket distribution of NFIs and basic life-saving materials and tools to all families initially and the later targeting of the neediest families for further support was relevant. Considering that needs were many and resources limited, Abari decided to target particular households to reach the most vulnerable and marginalized families. DDRC members in the districts which received support appreciated this approach but other stakeholders had mixed opinions about this dual approach. Some communities, like Balimtar, Gorkha, said that this approach was the right one for providing scarce resources to unreached segments of the population and that it resulted in the optimal use of resources. In Gaithum, Sindhupalchok, in contrast, people said that this approach was not wise as it discriminated among people though the earthquake had affected all equally. The stakeholders involved in the response work and government agencies admired the targeting approach greatly. In Gorkha, government officials during FGDs opined:

“Not all families were equally affected; hence, not all families are eligible to receive the same nature and quantity of relief materials. To get resources to the most-at-risk populations, targeting is an appropriate and meaningful approach. We suggest that other humanitarian agencies follow this approach. Of course, we should listen to people’s grievances but reality is reality.”

FGD at Balimtar, Gorkha; Jan 12, 2017

During the evaluation field visit, the district health inspector of Gorkha recalled how the relief work Abari was carrying out continued even when the camps that had been constructed collapsed in an aftershock. In fact, relief workers put their lives at stake to serve the most affected population. Many people had hidden in inaccessible places to save themselves from the risks of further aftershocks. To address the unmet needs of the most affected population, the project connected with other humanitarian agencies and helped people access additional resources.

h. Adhere to the government’s plans and protocols for emergency response

The projects were efficient because they timely and adequately addressed the protocols of the government in their assessment, planning, provision-of-relief, and transition-to-recovery efforts. The inputs of government officials and suggestions were strictly endorsed by the projects. The response phase was designed to run from April 2015 to December 2015 and the recovery phase was to run from November 2015 to December 2016. However, because of the blockade imposed by India and fuel crisis, the project was extended—at no cost—to February 2017. Abari received a deadline extension to February 28, 2017 on 8/31/2016 with email from Avaaz. Other reasons for delay included the fact that i) heavy monsoon rains made it difficult to transport construction materials to sites, (ii) repairing the roads to remote locations took time, (iii) it took a long time to get approval from Kavre District Education Office, especially for Karthari Secondary School, and (iv) the turnover of staff, especially junior staff, was high. In order to check staff turnover, Abari began to hire by assignment rather than by

the month. This was an efficient approach. Given that Abari has a good management style for mobilizing staff, except the Karthari School⁶, it is likely that project's activities will be finished towards the end of February 2017 without compromising the quality of the work.

There is no doubt that the projects (both response and recovery) were highly relevant to the needs of Nepal and the earthquake affected and that it was both timely and adequate. The projects maintained their relevance throughout the response and recovery periods. However, efforts to meet the basic needs of the poor, disadvantaged, and marginal segments of the earthquake-affected population took some time to gain momentum because many needs were identified only after the initial needs assessment. Overall, the projects were appropriate and their overall designs were suited to accommodating the issues and concerns of the affected. Relevance was evaluated in terms of (i) the project's goal and objectives and (ii) the project's areas and approaches.

Q2.4: Did ABARI staff and their partners have sufficient knowledge and training to do their work efficiently and effectively?

As Abari staff had little or no prior experience in emergency response and working with multiple donors, it was quite challenging for them to understand the essence of response and recovery phases. However, Abari staff was quite experienced in the design and preparation of easy-to-understand manuals for the construction of temporary and permanent shelters and schools. Using those manuals and on-the-job training, Abari and its multiple partners built the capacities of local people efficiently and effectively. There were no issues related to either the quality of training or timely reporting. Abari has been adhering to its four-level⁷ monitoring system to maintain governance and accountability.

Abari was somewhat overstretched: the workload, the nature of work, and the time available for the work threatened to tax the number and capacity of its staff. In some cases, there was also inadequate

⁶There was delay in initial start of the project, because it took a long time for the Department of Education for the structural approval and for ABARI to find the most suitable school through District Education Office. After a long deliberation, project was ambitiously started in the beginning of monsoon, which made the road condition and working condition not difficult. Moreover, 2016 experienced a prolonged monsoon, which caused further delay. As the bricks were made locally on site and had to be dried for 2 weeks, heavy monsoon caused a very strong abruption. Apart from that Nepal was facing a 9 month long economic blockade, where any form of transportation or purchase of conventional materials was extremely difficult. Despite this ABARI is in process to complete the two schools in the allocated time of February 28, 2017. The main structure and furniture is done, while only doors and windows remain to be put in place- which is being manufactured. Third school of Karthari, however was further delayed. They were delayed as the School Management Committee and Parents Teachers Association had hard time allocating the land to the new school. According to the school principal, as the school lies in a difficult mountain terrain, it took further time to level the land by hand and to create access ways. Nevertheless, all the wall and floor works have completed and ABARI is working on the roof. They expect a delay and hope to finish Karthari School by end of March, 2017.

⁷**(i) Programmatic level:** Abari's Executive Director (ED) assigns a Project Office (PO)/ Engineer each in place for the technical supervision of the Schools. Under PO, there are site supervisors, who are trained masons and overseers, who have had considerable working experience. PO liaisons with the project architect, and makes sure that the Site Supervisors are doing the construction as per the architects drawing. PO and Site Supervisors maintain logbook of their progress. The logs are randomly checked by the ED. ED also makes site visits every second week or more to evaluate progress. To ensure that there is no conflict of interest, PO makes all the procurement but all the payments are done by Finance Officer directly to the vendor after verifying it with the Site Supervisors.**(ii) SMC and PTA Level:** School Management Committee and Parents Teachers levels are very closely involved in the procurement and construction process. They manage the inventory and labor procurement. Any shortcomings or issues on the construction (depending on the severity) are relayed to Site Supervisor, PO or ED or District Education Office. So far all the issues have been resolved in the program level. **(iii) Abari's Board level monitoring:** ED sends online updates to the Board every month through its monthly newsletter. Although bylaw on requires biannual meeting, Abari board has already met 4 times in the last year to evaluate Abari's progress. Board endorses plans and policies on strategic levels.**(iv) DEO Level monitoring:** DEO is involved in the allocation and approval of the school designs as well as the sites. They make site visits intermittently to evaluate the progress and also can questions the integrity of the process, if it deems necessary. Interaction with DEO officials in Kavre revealed that they has been very happy with the progress and proudly hangs Abari's school design posters in their office.

clarity on how to keep balance among SMCs and PTAs with VDC and district-level stakeholders during project's implementation. Efficiency was measured in following heads:

a. Good project design and approach

At the operational level, both projects were designed and managed well and the resources available were used efficiently. The project's methods, which included building people's capacities and then mobilizing these capacitated individuals to construct safer homes and schools, were efficient. Because the project designs were good, it was possible for managers to coordinate with many agencies, including DDRCs, district-based government agencies, and humanitarian agencies working in the project's districts to promote programmatic synergy. That said, the level of coordination with district development committees (DDCs) and VDCs in the recovery project was inadequate for co-financing.

Both projects provided support to earthquake-affected families as new needs emerged. Both projects were need- and context-based instead of following a very structured pattern. During the response phase, Abari distributed relief materials in Gorkha, Lamjung, and Dhading districts. Then, when big international NGOs like Save the Children and World Vision provided a large supply of relief resources to earthquake affected families, Abari changed its approach and concentrated on formulating different building typologies and designs and preparing an easy-to-understand manual, both crucial needs at a time when every agency was confused.

b. Emphasis on local skills, knowledge, and human resources

Since the majority of Abari staff were locals familiar with the local dialects, customs, and culture, mobilization was easy. Cooperation among relevant stakeholders and agencies was good, so it was possible to establish a culture of resource-sharing and thereby systematize response and recovery work. The project management was well-balanced and devoted as much attention to promoting good relations with relevant stakeholders as to implementing activities. The management style was democratic, and there was a sense of team spirit and belonging among earthquake-affected communities. As a result, community contribution during the response and recovery phases was approximately USD 20,000 during transitional school and shelter construction and USD 25,000 during recovery (refer annex-1, table 5). USD 7622 was mobilized immediately by Abari as co-funding the transitional schools collected from its own efforts, and ActionAid Nepal provided USD 7500 for transitional shelter. Moreover, in recovery phase after the approval of the school design, and as Abari started the construction of three schools in Kavre, 5 additional schools with 18 classrooms are being built (Kavre-3, Nuwakot-1 and Sindhupalchok-1). The funding came in not as co-funds but as service contracts which were more than 200,000 USD. Moreover, the communities on their own discretion are building more than 15 homes, with more than USD 150,000.

c. Took into account response and recovery needs well and planned adequately

Both projects successfully involved marginalized sections of society, including poor families and families with persons with disabilities and older persons in planning, implementing, and following up on project activities. Such a high degree of involvement ensured that action in preparing for and putting in operation the earthquake response and recovery work was efficient and dynamic. The project's records indicate that project beneficiaries comprised served about 17% of Brahmin-Chhetri families, 41% *janajati*, 27% Dalits, and 15% other caste and ethnicity groups (refer annex-1, table 6). The fact that the project's resources focused largely on *janajati* and Dalit groups is logical given that their degree of marginalization and deprivation is substantial.

Because of its far-sighted approach, Abari was not limited to the execution of defined project activities during the response phase. It was also able to incorporate genuine emerging recovery considerations and thereby ensure the overall wellbeing of the earthquake-affected through simultaneous assessments and planning for the recovery phase with relevant stakeholders. Abari and its multiplepartners⁸ were very clear about how the response phase was linked to the recovery and development phases. As a

⁸(i) People In Need, (ii) Learning Planet, (iii) Believers, (iv) Tents to Nepal, (v) Hands with Hands, and (vi) Action Aid

result, the response project did not stand alone but was incorporated into the scope and values of the later recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction phases. Abari maintained good coordination with many agencies during the response phase, thereby establishing synergy. It coordinated with People In Need, Learning Planet, and Believers for logistical support during distribution of relief items while it made partnership with People In Need, Tents to Nepal and Learning Planet for logistical and material support during the construction of transitional schools (refer annex-I, table 7). During the construction of transitional shelters, Abari collaborated with Hands with Hands and ActionAid Nepal for logistics and financial support. In the recovery phase, it partnered three schools⁹ in Kavre and received logistics and funding supports from Avaaz.

d. Projects' monitoring mechanisms

Progress updates were communicated to Avaaz through (i) frequent email correspondence, (ii) occasional Skype meetings as needed, (iii) period progress updates on Abari's website way, (iv) submission of midterm and final progress reports and (v) Abari's audit report with Avaaz-funded projects showed separately. However, there were no systematic and easy to use formats and tools to monitor community-level activities that could give to staff precise indications of the level of achievements or ensure the bidirectional flow of information at all levels. There was also no risk matrix or back-up/contingency plan to ensure the proper mitigation of risks. Despite the lack of structured monitoring templates and formats, however, the project's internal monitoring mechanism effectively kept a close eye on ongoing field activities. To monitor field-level activities, field staff were instructed to prepare short notes regarding the district they worked in and its location, the number of families that received services, and photographs; to collect letters¹⁰ from each CBO, NGO, and school they had worked with as evidence that they had distributed relief material; and to take short videos while constructing shelters, homes, and schools, again as evidence.

e. Use of local resources when designing and implementing activities

Abari optimized in-country resources—materials as well as humans—during the design and implementation of projects. For example, it recruited local staff and volunteers instead of hiring staff from outside and used bamboo, soil and locally trained masons to construct transitional homes and shelters and permanent homes and schools. During the response project, out of the total 134 staff, 100 were from local area. Now, in the recovery phase, out of 124 staff, 73 are local. But as most of the local staff were not very experienced in the types of work to be carried out, the initial phase was a bit disorganized until the project provided on-the-job trainings to the staff and work progressed systematically. Because Abari re-hired the staff it had hired in the response phase in the recovery phase, work was very efficient. The quality of the projects was enhanced as there was a healthy degree of flexibility in adjusting activities as needed without affecting the projects' objectives.

f. Abari's management process

Abari's management processes were efficient. The project spent time and resources making an effective and inclusive plan and management process using coordinated needs assessments and careful analysis of the views of relevant stakeholders. One of the key approaches to implementing the projects was to work in partnership and collaboration with different organizations. Both projects successfully coordinated with many agencies, including district disaster relief committees, district education offices, district government line agencies, and district-based humanitarian agencies to systematize response and recovery work. Because coordination was good, it was possible to eliminate existing duplication, thereby fostering managerial efficiency.

Monthly meetings were held for the staff of Abari and other relevant agencies to systematize the response and recovery work. The outcomes and learning of all these monthly meetings were well reflected in the planning and execution of Abari's work. These meetings were also instrumental in

⁹Janajyoti Primary School, Saraswati Secondary School, and Karthari Secondary School.

¹⁰ Letters were received from Learning Planet, Hands with Hands, People in Need, and local schools. It has also made MoU with DDRC Gorkha.

troubleshooting issues, concerns, and challenges and implementing the projects as quickly as possible using a participatory approach.

g. Adequacy of funding and staffing

No partner, agency, or staff member mentioned any issue related to resource constraints or inadequate human resources for the implementation of the projects. Instead, they said that there was a rush to best utilize the available project's resources for the welfare of earthquake-affected people. Because the project covered a large array of activities, project staff had to rush to complete them without adequate preparation, a fact which sometimes hindered systematic execution and challenged the project's efficiency and quality. Despite these shortcomings, the projects maintained quality and transparency in all their plans and programs. Because the management approach was well-designed, the limited staff body was strategically mobilized to provide technical backstopping of project's activities. The team spirit of the project staff and division of the workload and responsibilities among them was very encouraging.

h. Funding flow to respond to humanitarian and recovery needs

The projects delivered their efforts efficiently because of Avaaz's value addition during both the response and recovery projects. Avaaz's timely management and disbursement of funds, distant monitoring, technical backstopping, and provision of unrestricted funds, especially for the formulation of designs manuals in both English and Nepali languages contributed to the efficiency of the projects. The funding-flow mechanism was timely and adequate, thereby enabling the projects to be executed efficiently. The funds were spent strategically on the genuine needs of earthquake-affected families.

Q2.6: How effective was the ABARI in facilitating and coordinating the response efforts in Nepal for earthquake response?

Abari was effective in facilitating and coordinating response efforts because it conducted a quick review of the context and made decisions immediately. The project coordinated and collaborated with humanitarian actors in the project districts to achieve synergetic impacts that reached affected populations who were in need of assistance. The DDRC members in each project district appreciated the role of and progress achieved by Abari's response project. Government and other DRR stakeholders admired the role of Abari in collaborating and creating linkages and its use of targeting to select beneficiaries. Though other agencies were working in the same VDCs that this project did, there was not much duplication of resources because the project shared the list of beneficiaries with all agencies that were willing to joins hands in the relief distribution.

Q 2.7: How does the ABARI response support the local structures (state, local NGOs) in such a way that they would be better prepared to respond should disaster strike again?

The evidence gathered at FGDs revealed that Abari's response support increases the capacity of local government and non-government structures to respond should disaster strike again. First, wherever possible, it utilized and strengthened existing social structures at the ward and VDC levels rather than creating new structures, increasing their ability to deal with future disasters. It worked through and collaborated closely with VDC, WCF, and community disaster management committee (CDMC) and in this way strengthened their capacities and the culture of coordination.

Second, Abari and its multiple partner agencies built their own capacities for dealing with future disaster risks. However, the evaluation revealed that there is still a need to conduct capacity-building in qualitative monitoring and evaluation tools for staff, which voiced concerns over its ability to measure results correctly. The training and orientation Abari provided on livelihoods, masonry, and carpentry to local CBOs strengthened the capacity of these organizations to withstand future disasters. The masonry and carpentry trainings improve local skill in the construction of earthquake-resistant houses. However, it is important to note that the unintended outcomes of such training are many. For example, some newly trained carpenters migrated to other areas, projects, and even other countries with their newly acquired skills as the wages for skilled laborers are higher elsewhere. In the future, in selecting skills for income

generation activities training, more attention must be given to the relevance and appropriateness of those for the local market. In order to use the skills of trained people within the village, a suitable age group, preferably those 40+, should be considered while selecting trainees.

Third, Abari established a good working relationship with district-based stakeholders and linked communities and schools with relevant government agencies. During the response phase, the project coordinated with DDRCs and DEOs, signing MoUs with both for managing relief and transitional schools respectively. During the recovery phase, it coordinated well with the DOE and the DUDBC at the national level to secure approval for its designs; with DEOs and DDCs at the district level to secure approval for permanent schools, and with VDCs at the local level (refer annex-1, table 8).

3.3 Evaluation objective 3 *(To evaluate financial efficiency and accountability and effective use of funds through a thorough review of financial documents, comparison with industry averages for the main activities, review of quality of goods and services and information collection within communities)*

Q 3.1: Rights holders' engagement, accountability practices and complaints mechanisms

The evaluation found that for each of the key interventions of both projects, there was a high level of engagement of both rights-holders (project's beneficiaries) and duty bearers (government agencies): they provided much input and feedback. The processes for selecting both beneficiaries and schools and the needs assessment were all highly participatory and democratic. During the FGDs, project stakeholders admired the project's participatory approach to selecting families and schools. As was discussed above, both projects used accountability practices and complaint mechanisms in order to identify the issues and concerns of rights holders. However, during FGDs and in the household survey with women revealed that they were less aware than men about beneficiary selection and complaints mechanisms. It also became apparent that women were less frequently consulted than men and that women thought that there was more unintended harm than men did.

Careful review of project documents and field visits revealed that the projects were transparent and accountable to donors, governments, and local civil societies to some extent. Social audits were not carried out though if they had been, they would have helped settle minor disputes at the local level amicably. Abari shared its plans, mandates, and budget with district-level stakeholders in Kavre and Sindhupalchok at the beginning of the project and contributed to efforts to improve governance, but it did not establish district project advisory committees (DPAC) for review and reflection or for joint monitoring of quality. The use of DPACs is an approach recently adopted in Nepal for promoting accountability and transparency. Though there were no formal DPACs, 'resource persons' (school supervisors of DEOs) and local Abari staff monitored and supervised schools in consultation with SMCs, PTAs, and provided instant feedback and suggestions. This provision fostered accountability and transparency.

To procure materials, a system of comparing the cost and quality of each item offered by different vendors was used to make decision based on the principle of 'value for money'. Almost no FGD participants or survey respondents had paid anyone any unofficial fee to receive shelters or other project's benefits. However, some people said that the budgets they were entitled to were not shared fairly. Publishing plans, mandates, and budget is a good way to educate project beneficiaries and duty bearers, but over-transparency sometimes creates confusion. Many agencies have not fully disclosed project budget to the public for fear that they could be forced to provide money to Maoist splinter groups, which for some years have forcibly collected donations by threatening project staff. FGD participants in Kavre said this about sharing budgets:

"In principle, sharing plans and budget is a good way to disseminate information and maintain transparency. But if we really disclose our budget publicly, maybe Maoist splinter groups will extort money from us. This is quite usual these days. They have often asked us to disclose the school budget. As the budget is quite tight for finishing the construction work, we are not open about its specifics. The DEO and SMC have limited budgets"

The majority of FDG participants said that Abari staff had behaved very respectfully in all phases of the project, from planning to implementation to follow-up. The project's internal control and quality assurance system (compliance, monitoring, and audits) was found good. Abari's procurement system was systematic. Using the field appraisal of the project's engineer, the financial officer prepared a proposal for procurement, had it approved by the executive director and later endorsed by Abari's board. To avoid conflicts of interest, payments to vendors and suppliers are made directly by the financial officer. The 'advanced settlements system' was also in line with standard accounting procedures. Abari used tally software to keep double entry accounts. Though the system was very good, the inventory system was not very organized. As only the Executive Director could sign bank cheque as per the provisions set forth in Abari's Bylaws, it was sometimes difficult to ensure a system of crosschecking and balance in financial management. Abari had a single signatory- CEO as it is a one person owned business enterprise. In Abari Foundation, since it has an Executive Board, there are two signatories, one ED and other Finance Officer. The payments are made directly to the vendors by cheque after deducting taxes. Payments over 500USD are made through account payee cheques. Payments are made only after receiving VAT bills and through voucher or contracts for Individual consultant. All the bills are verified by government appointed auditor who compliance them to make an audit report. The report is sent to Abari Board for final review. Board members review the report and send them back if they have any comments. Once auditor and Board sign the audit report, it is sent to Internal Revenue Department (IRD) for the final check. If IRD is satisfied, they issue Tax Clearance Certificate. Abari has already received Tax Clearance for this year's report. As there was no detailed breakdown of Avaaz-funded grants (USD 150,000 during the response phase and USD 200,000 during the recovery phase), Abari used its own judgment to ensure the best use of money. If there had been at least a crude breakdown of the budget, it would have been easier for Abari to track their planning and subsequent phases.

During the fieldwork, the evaluation team gathered input and feedback from government official at DEOs, members of WCFs and DDRCs, and district-based journalists in order to triangulate the level of transparency and accountability and found no serious issues. Respondents praised Abari's efforts in targeting remote areas and reaching the most vulnerable of communities and schools. Stakeholders also praised the fact that a "blanket approach" was used during the relief phase of the emergency to distribute essential basic need items such as NFIs, with the ultimate goal of saving lives and reaching all, but that later Abari used a "targeted approach" to ensure the best use of project resources.

Complaints and feedback were received through both formal and informal channels although Abari made use of the latter. During the fieldwork, stakeholders confirmed that the number and types of complaints against Abari was significantly less compared with complaints against other NGOs. At the project level, complaints and feedback were received mostly in regular reports by adding a 'challenges' section to the reporting format. The projects were also open to suggestions at meetings of Abari.

Complaints were mostly related to the list of beneficiaries entitled to relief packages, the types and quality of relief items. There were some complaints against community leaders but such complaints were never forwarded to Abari for fear that they would affect social solidarity in a given village. While providing a written format and complaint boxes does enable beneficiaries to express their grievances and lodge a complaint, they were of limited use in a largely illiterate society, where having to rely on someone else to write undermines the confidentiality of the process. Knowing that any unintentional disclosures could destroy social solidarity and harmony and break social relationships makes people less willing to be honest.

While the forms of receiving complaints directly were good, setting up complaint and feedback mechanisms that allow anonymity, such as a toll-free number, could benefit people who are shy or socially challenged or whose voices often go unheard as well as maintain confidentiality. The erection of a flex board supplying project-related information, allocating a nodal person to register feedback, and

mobilizing radio services to receive comments and suggestions are other effective means of improving the feedback mechanism.

The evaluation also assessed some of the accountability parameters to gauge the effectiveness of services using four criteria: (i) the level of involvement of earthquake-affected families during the project's execution, (ii) whether or not the advice of women was sought, (iii) the mechanism for redressing complaints, and (iv) knowledge about information related to relief and support. According to the household survey, the affected population was satisfied with Abari's efforts to ensure accountability, participation, and transparency.

SN	Key questions	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
1	Did Abari seek the advice of your household in its programs?	84	72	78
2	Did Abari seek the advice of the women in your household?	82	68	75
3	Did Abari provide a system for making complaints?	74	65	69
4	Did Abari provide enough of the sort of information you needed to get relief and support?	90	82	86

Source: Household survey, 2017

The accountability parameters revealed that satisfaction with various criteria ranges from 69% to 86%. Satisfaction with access to information, at 86%, is highest, while that with the complaint mechanism, at 69%, is the least. The evaluation found that Abari did not erect information boards to share the salient features of the project or install feedback boxes at the VDC level so that people lodge any complaints they had confidentially. Abari had a mechanism for discussing all complaints of local people in weekly staff meetings and necessary action was taken without delay. Still, 14% respondents opined that they did not receive the right information at the right time from Abari. Delays in disseminating information may result in people living far from the distribution point not receiving their share of relief services. The project could have made a little more effort to inform vulnerable families at least few days in advance so that they would not be left out. About not getting enough information about relief distribution, women participants in an FGD held in Gaithum, Sindhupalchok, said:

“We have heard that families living along the road head received more relief than we who live in remote areas. They received more benefits because they are clever and have access to information and because people from relief agencies are not willing to visit remote areas. We were not able to access information about the date, venue, or time of the distribution of relief materials. We wish that we could have received accurate information from FM radio stations. We have no complaints about the quality of relief materials provided by the project, but they should be distributed before the monsoon before rain hinders the safe transportation of relief materials.”

FGD in Gaithum, Sindhupalchok, Jan 21, 2017

No participant in any FGD said that a feedback box was essential. In fact, people are a bit reluctant to use written complaint mechanisms, partly due to illiteracy and partly due to the fear of reprisals against written complaints. People were generally more comfortable with face-to-face methods of making complaints and using complaint telephone lines (especially when the telephone number is not of Abari but of VDC officials) since mobile phone coverage is high. The project did not, however, use FM radio, the most efficient means of communication at the local level. During the FGD at Sindhupalchok, stakeholders opined:

“Though the Abari-implemented project did not last long, it provided room for beneficiaries to express their grievances and lodge complaints by periodically organizing community meetings. We think this initiative to redress complaints is good. In an illiterate society, it is often difficult to fill in a written format and use a complaint box because complaints written by someone else are not a secret and any disclosure can upset social solidarity and break up social relationships. Is it not possible for everyone to do a good job so there is no need for a mechanism to redress complaints? Please keep in mind that harmony and solidarity are the jewels of society. After all, local people have to live by sharing and caring.”

FGD in Kiwool, Sindhupalchok, January 20, 2017

Providing information about relief distribution in advance fostered the project’s accountability to beneficiaries. Stakeholders also shared the benefits of having project information boards at VDC offices, the project related information over local FM radio stations, and the project’s community-level social auditing system, which it used to promote the accountability and transparency of the project. FGD participants also recalled that some humanitarian agencies undertook social audits in which communities performed audits with the help of trained facilitators. Even though Abari did not use any of these mechanisms to promote accountability, the evaluation team did not notice any major reasons it could not easily set up use such accountability mechanisms. In fact, given how homogeneous the cultural set-up of the project’s communities is, it ought to be fairly easy.

Q 3.2: Project’s financial efficiency and accountability system for the effective use of funds

FGD consultations confirmed that project’s stakeholders (both duty bearers and rights holders) were satisfied with the financial efficiency and accountability system that Abari used to ensure the effective use of funds in its targeted interventions. The results of the household survey corroborated the point: only 11% (9% male and 13% female) of respondents said that they had not received the support and relief materials that they needed and 83% of respondents opined that Abari and its staff appeared to have correctly handled money and resources during the implementation of the project’s activities. These results demonstrate that the level of accountability and transparency is high.

Key questions	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
1. Were there any groups and individuals in need of support that did not receive the support and relief materials needed?	9	13	11
2. In your perspective, did Abari and their staff appear to correctly handle money and resources?	88	79	83

Source: Household survey, 2017

Abari’s financial policies and procedures were used to ensure value for money in the procurement of materials. It also adhered to the principle of “value for money” in its plans and programs, putting into practice the popular saying “a dollar spent on disaster risk reduction (DRR) saves seven dollars in economic development losses.” Efficiency was further enhanced because the project acquired the required logistics management through a short procurement process. Under Abari’s financial policy, up to NPR 500,000 could be procured directly without securing three different quotations and tendering, as is usually required. There are no serious issues reflected by the independent auditors. The review of email correspondence and cross checks with relevant stakeholders also revealed that there is no any evidence that justify the mishandling of fund.

Q 3.3: Bills analysis and comparison with industry averages

During the fieldwork, a sample of bills from the Abari finance department was tallied with the expenses shown in the financial report and compared with industry averages to see whether the expenses shown were reasonable. For this, a number of discussions were held with relevant individuals. It was found that there was a good correlation between the total amount reflected in the financial report and the sum of all bills and receipts. In the case of Jana Jyoti Primary School, bills and receipts were neither properly inventoried nor kept systematically. Careful individual interviewing of randomly selected vendors and suppliers during the field visit showed that bills and receipts as well as rates and total amounts were all genuine. The evaluation team inspected the receipts of vendors and suppliers to verify this fact.

A thorough comparison of the building features and costs of Abari-constructed edifices (homes, shelters, and schools) and similar GoN and Caritas-funded edifices revealed that in all cases, transitional and permanent schools and homes, Abari-constructed edifices had more features but were less expensive: its transitional schools and shelters were 15% cheaper, its permanent schools 22% cheaper, and its permanent homes 35% cheaper (refer annex-I, table 11). This shows the cost-efficiency of Abari’s interventions.

To construct three permanent schools in Kavre District, Abari adopted two different approaches: with Jana Jyoti Primary School in Bhangeri, it signed a memorandum of agreement (MoA) with the SMC to create a new construction sub-committee to work with the project but in the case of Saraswoti and Karthari secondary schools, it implemented its plans directly. Signing an agreement with the SMC was beneficial in that it was easy to mobilize people and the sense of ownership of and pride in work was considerable but this was a comparatively expensive and slow approach as meetings were irregular and it was hard to convince SMS members to adopt Abari's procedures. Direct implementation had the advantages of high-quality construction, a fast procurement process, and easy initiation of activities but it suffered from considerable skepticism at the outset, slow scalability, and mistrust of the relatively few SMC members who were actively involved (refer annex-1, table 2). From the perspective of accountability and transparency view, SMCs should sign a MoA, as the FGD participants of Karthari made clear:

"...In our school, Abari directly constructed the school building. Though the roles of the SMC and the PTA were considerable, we were not informed about the day-to-day operation of the budget. Though we are happy with Abari and there were no transparency issues, if we had been in charge of the budget, we could have used the fund more effectively to make additional infrastructures. This point should be considered in the future. For a better quality project, SMCs and PTAs should be involved..."

FGD on Karthari of Kavre, Jan 14, 2017

Q 3.4: Building quality and reflection of the value shown in the books.

Using random sampling, four sets of bills were picked up from Abari financial department to tally with physical progress on schools and homes. The physical progress of each of the three permanent schools in terms of the structure, roof, compound, playground, and furniture was compared to the total expenditure recorded and a thorough analysis undertaken (table 1). Except for the supply of furniture at Janajyoti Primary School, there were no discrepancies and about the furniture it was said that it had been prepared in Ramnagar, Chitwan, and would reach the school in a week or two.

Table 1: Status of physical progress of schools

SN	School	Percentage of progress				
		Structure	Roof	Compound	Play ground	Furniture
1	Janajyoti Primary School	100	95	80 *	90	75
2	Saraswoti Secondary School	100	95	100	90	100
3	Karthali Secondary School	100	50	50*	75	*

*The school is responsible for this contribution.

The budget for the earthquake-response project had eight headings, (i) relief material, (ii) transitional schools, (iii) demonstration permanent home, (iv) transitional homes, (v) tools, (vi) travel, (vii) repair and maintenance, (viii) printing and stationery, a suitable number and considering the nature of the project. The program cost was USD 138,553 (91%) and the operation cost, USD 13,882 (9%), a commendable split. The earthquake-recovery project had nine budget headings, (i) construction materials, (ii) wages and training, (iii) salaries, (iv) food and accommodations for trainees, (v) fuel, (vi) rent, (vii) travel, (viii) furniture and fixtures, and (ix) miscellaneous. The item-wise breakdown seems logical and upon analysis of program and operational budget, it is revealed that the program cost was USD 151,457 (79%) and the operation cost, USD 40,653 (21%), refer also annex-2. The high percentage spent on operations seems reasonable given that the project was scattered across a remote area.

Q 3.5: Beneficiary satisfaction

During its field visits, the evaluation team thoroughly checked a random sample of beneficiaries to see whether or not they had got the cash and the in-kind goods they were promised, whether or not they were satisfied with the quality of the goods, and whether or not they thought what they had received was the value shown in the project accounts. No FGD participant said no.

It was good that project was quite flexible about the nominal costs of construction. The budget remaining until January 15, 2017 is USD 7,889 (4% of the total approved budget). As physical progress was close to 95%, there was a good correlation between the remaining budget and the tasks left to be completed under the scope of work. There was also a close budget correlation between the hardware and software components of recovery project, which were USD 79,677 (53%) and USD 71,780 (47%) respectively. Some schools complained that the costs exceeded those agreed upon. Considering the difficult geographical terrain and the lack of roads in inner VDCs, it seems inevitable that transportation costs would be high.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusion

Both projects brought some significant changes in the quality of life of earthquake affected people and their families. In particular, they reduced their vulnerability to disasters and increased the capacity to respond effectively to disaster events. Implementation of planned activities is flexible enough to allow for adjustments to each specific field situation.

The projects maintained their relevance throughout the response and recovery periods. For each of the key interventions of both projects, there was a high level of engagement of both rights holders (project's beneficiaries) and duty bearers (government agencies): they provided much input and feedback. The processes for selecting both beneficiaries and schools and the needs assessment were all highly participatory and democratic. Both projects used accountability practices and complaint mechanisms in order to identify the issues and concerns of rights holders. However, during FGDs and in the household survey with women revealed that they were less aware than men about beneficiary selection and complaints mechanisms. It also became apparent that women were less frequently consulted than men and that women thought that there was more unintended harm than men did. Project's interventions were highly relevant, appropriate, and timely in addressing the needs, expectations, and priorities of the earthquake-affected population. Both projects were designed to fulfill three interrelated objectives: (i) save lives, (ii) facilitate early recovery, and (iii) reduce future risks. Careful review of project documents and consultations with the Abari team and district-level stakeholders revealed that the overall goals and objectives of both projects were fulfilled.

4.2 Recommendations

The recommendations below are formulated based on the overall analysis of the project's results. Abari and its multiple partners should concentrate their efforts for the remaining of the project period and designing similar projects in the future. Recommendations are broadly categorized into two: programmatic and operational:

4.2.1 Programmatic recommendations

a. Build the capacity of staff in participatory monitoring and learning: Abari and its multiple partners should develop easy-to-use formats and tools for monitoring community- and school-based activities so that staff will know precisely the level of achievement. For effective financial monitoring, budgets should be broken down into smaller headings (specifying different items with unit rate) rather than the lump sum amount. Social media like Face-book page could be developed and used to share project updates. FM radio, Street drama, folksongs, and drills are other effective participatory tools to disseminate the project's progress.

b. Practice joint assessment to avoid duplication: To eliminate duplication in programs with other humanitarian agencies, Abari and its multiple partners should carry out joint assessments, studies, and rapid needs assessments. Coordination should be strong even during the early stage of an emergency to ensure that there are no unrealistic expectations and to systematize the response.

c. Emphasize gender sensitivity during project design: Women's roles and aspirations are often ignored during beneficiary selection, needs assessment, and decision-making. While designing a project, Abari and its multiple partners should consider gender sensitivity issues and gender-sensitivity training should be imparted to all staff. To ensure that the voices of women are heard, protection issues should also be considered.

d. Focus on non-structural assessments too: To reduce multiple risks at schools, along with structural assessment, Abari and its multiple partners should emphasize non-structural assessments. The trimming of tall trees within the school vicinity, maintenance of slippery areas near school toilets, removal of hanging materials that pose risks, management of desks and benches, and provision of a second door in the room for emergency exits are some of the many actions that could be implemented to promote safety.

e. Work through schools to promote ownership: In the future, to foster transparency in construction work at schools, Abari and its multiple partners should do MoA with SMCs (as did in Jana jyoti Primary School of Kavre) rather than act as direct implementers. MoA with SMC would foster a sense of ownership and generate ideas for future operations and maintenance. Improvement in social amenities like water and sanitation facilities, and fencing around the school compound, should be considered while preparing the budget.

f. Adopt flexible designs, approaches, and processes: Abari's design was specifically made for the mountain regions- keeping earthquake affected regions in mind. The school designs are modular- they are only composed of two independent classrooms. Depending the site and geographic terrain, they were arranged in U or I or L shape. They also take care of the climatic features in mind for example it has good passive heating system and good flow of air for ventilation. Furthermore, they are disabled friendly. Abari design at this point can only go up to one storey, because of government regulation. Therefore, sites that have very limited space may not be able to have ABARI design. Moreover, in certain sites, where earth and bamboo is not available, Abari design also will not be relevant. In the future, Abari should design location and geographical terrain specific school/home to reduce the physical vulnerability and risks.

g. Foster learning-oriented joint monitoring: To promote accountability and transparency and dispel unjustified expectations, Abari and its multiple partner should share their plans, mandates, and budgets with stakeholders. To foster transparency and build trust among stakeholders, they should be involved in monitoring. The DPAC approach should be instated to improve governance. To protect the program from external risks, Abari and its multiple partner should develop a risk matrix and a risk-mitigating back-up or contingency plan.

h. Carry out social auditing using a "process approach": To reduce the likelihood of disputes over project transparency, social audits of completed infrastructures should be conducted with SMC and PTA members and with other CBOs working in the command area of each school. In the future, social auditing should be carried out at least twice, at the beginning and at the end of the project and should address both programmatic as well as financial aspects. Social auditing should be seen as a process not an event. Information boards should be erected at schools specifying the salient features of the school, including total budget (Avaaz and community contribution) along with visibility logo of GoN, Abari and Avaaz. Abari and its multiple partners should adhere participatory complain redress mechanism to foster community's spirit and solidarity.

i. Mainstream multi-hazard risks in schools improvement plans: Abari and its multiple partners should facilitate for the modification of school improvement plans (SIPs) in light of multi-hazard risk assessments and earthquake safety measures. SIPs should include a right-to-safe-schools campaign and response plans in order to save time during emergencies. To make sure that DRR education truly becomes mainstreamed, more consultation with teachers' networks and more training through resource

centers are needed. Resources should be leveraged from local government and development agencies to translate SIP provisions into action.

j. Document good practices and lessons learnt: Abari and its multiple partners should manage external resource person to document project's generated good practices and learning thoroughly. They should carry out periodic review-and-reflection sessions together to share learning and good practices as proper dissemination of good practices often aided in leveraging resources. Emphasis should be placed on coordination with DDCs and VDCs in the recovery project so that resources can be leveraged and targets met and surpassed and to ensure the sustainability of initiatives.

4.2.2 Operational recommendations

a. Manage full time staff for project monitoring and technical backstopping: Project staff should spend more of their time providing technical solutions, guidance and motivation than carrying out micro implementation. Abari should have one full time monitoring officer for coordination and linkages for external resource generation and timely monitoring of the project's on-going activities. To take project activities to greater heights, hiring full-time staff would be more cost-effective than assignment based staff. Finance officer should increase his/her field days to monitor financial transactions and technical backstopping. It is good to see that ABARI uses 'tally software', which is adequate and effective for maintaining financial management because it provides double entry book keeping system, it can easily aggregate and disaggregate the cost and also show the stocks of materials. Apart from 'tally software', Abari should develop financial track monitoring software for keeping better books and account. Tally software allows managing multiple financial & business functions with the help of a single software. It also allows seamless integration of business operations and offers efficient, simplified solutions for even the most complex business functions. Books and account would be more systematized through tally software.

b. Maintain proper inventory and process note of large procurement: Although Abari's Bylaws mentions that there should be biannual meetings, a total of 4 board meetings were held in 2016. Sometimes inventory of materials like bamboo and earth might not be always possible because of relatively large wastage, Abari has a robust mechanism to monitor where the tools and construction materials are located. Abari and its multiple partners should maintain proper inventory of the project's goods and equipment and keep the process note of each of the large procurements for clarity. Abari should assure the quarterly board meeting is held to review the overall progress, troubleshoot problems, and to formulate the plan of action for each quarter.

Annexes

Annex-I: Additional tables

Table 1: Basic element of three schools

SN	Basic elements	Jana Jyoti Primary School	Saraswoti Secondary School	Karthali Secondary school
1	Plinth area (square feet)	1680	1680	1680
2	Door size (square feet)	28	28	28
3	Window size (square feet)	20	20	20
4	Floor height (feet)	8	8	8
5	Room number	3 (2 rooms 1 play space)	6(4 rooms 2 play space)	3
6	Room size (square feet)	450 each	450 each	450 each

Source: Project's record, field consultation, 2017

Table 2: Difference in implementation approach (SMC vs. direct from Abari)

SN	Approach	Positive aspects	Negative aspect
1	Direct MoA with SMCs (in Jana Jyoti Primary School, Bhangeri, Kavre)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easy to mobilize • Increase the sense of ownership/pride in work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparatively expensive • Slow in process as meetings are often irregular • Hard to convince SMC in project approach and procedures
2	Direct implemented from Abari (Saraswoti Secondary School and Karthari Secondary School, Kavre)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher in quality construction • Fast procurement process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Skepticism in the initial days • Slow scalability • Poor trust (only few SMC members active hence mistrust by other SMC members to them)

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 3: Target vs. achievements of key interventions of response project

SN	Type of intervention	Target	Achievements
1	Permanent Home (demo)	2	15 under construction by house-owner from their own resources
2	Permanent Model School	3	8 under construction by leveraging the resource from other agencies

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 4: Progress status of key interventions during response phase

SN	Major intervention	Number	People trained	Manual reached	Key activities
1	Immediate relief	10000 +	-	-	Distribution of relief materials
2	Transitional shelter	200+	300+	30000+	Trainings, supervisions, open source manual, required resources
2	Transitional schools	200+	150 +	20,000 +	Trainings, supervisions, open source manual, required resources

Source: Abari's project's records, KIs and FGDs, 2017

Table 5: Status of communication contribution in different interventions

SN	Key activities	Community contribution (in USD)
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1.	Earthquake response project	
1.1	Distribution of relief items	
1.2	Transitional school	10,000 USD (in kind and labor)
1.3	Transitional Shelter	10,000 USD (in material and labor)
2.	Earthquake recovery project	
2.1	Permanent Home	20,000 USD (in materials)
2.2	Permanent Model School	5000 USD (in material and labor)

Source: Project's record, 2017

Table 6: Project beneficiaries in terms of caste/ethnicity

SN	Key activities	Caste and ethnicity (in %)			
		Brahmin-Chhetri	Janajati	Dalits	Others
1	Earthquake response project				
1.1	Distribution of relief items	15	40	25	20
1.2	Transitional school	20	50	20	10
1.3	Transitional Shelter	20	30	30	20
2	Earthquake recovery project				
2.1	Permanent Home	20	40	25	15
2.2	Permanent Model School	10	45	35	10

Source: Project's record, 2017/CBS 2011

Table 7: Partners and their roles in both projects

SN	Key activities	Partners	Key roles and responsibilities
1	Earthquake response project		
1.1	Distribution of relief items	People In Need Learning Planet Believers	Logistical Support
1.2	Transitional school	People In Need, Tents to Nepal Learning Planet	Logistical support and Material Support (Tents to Nepal)
1.3	Transitional Shelter	Hands with Hands Action Aid	Logistic support, Financial Support
2	Earthquake recovery project		
2.1	Permanent Homes	NA	NA
2.3	Permanent Model School	Jana Jyoti Primary School, Saraswati Secondary School, Karthari Primary School	Logistic Support, In kind Support

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 8: Coordination with government agencies

SN	Key activities	Government agencies	Key roles and responsibilities
1	Earthquake response project		
1.1	Distribution of relief items	CDO	Signing of MOU and giving permission
1.2	Transitional school	CDO	Signing of MOU and giving permission
1.3	Transitional Shelter		
2	Earthquake recovery project		
2.1	Permanent Home	DUDBC	Approval of Design
2.2	Permanent Model School	DOE	Approval of Design

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 9: Evidence of replication/scaling up

SN	Key activities	Replicated by (whom)	District/VDC	Changes made
1	Earthquake response project			
1.1	Distribution of relief items	NA	NA	NA
1.2	Transitional school	Communities in Chuchepati,	Kathmandu	Changing of roofing material
1.3	Transitional Shelter	Communities in Sindhupalchok, ActionAid	Sindhupalchok	Changing of Materials

2	Earthquake recovery project			
2.1	Permanent Homes	Communities in Kavre and Habitat For Humanity	Kavre	Same
2.2	Permanent Model Schools	Communities in Kavre, Nuwakot	Kavre Timal, Kavre Dhulikhel, Ratomate, Nuwakot	Same

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 10: Target vs. achievements

SN	Key interventions	Target	Achievements	Reasons for under and over progress
1	Earthquake response project			
1.1	Distribution of relief items	Supply of Materials	Supply of Materials	
1.2	Transitional school	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Design of Open Source Manual.	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Over 80 schools built using the Open Source Documents.	Was taken by national and international media as a good practice and disseminated widely across the country
1.3	Transitional Shelter	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Design of Open Source Manual	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials Design of Open Source Documents. Over 1500 structures were built using our Open Source Documents	Was taken by national and international media as a good practice and disseminated widely across the country
2	Earthquake recovery project			
2.1	Permanent Home	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Design of Open Source Manual	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Design of Open Source Manual. Awaiting for it to be listed in Forthcoming Government Catalogue 2	There was a massive delay in dissemination of Government Grant to individual homeowners for the construction of Houses. It only happened about 2 months ago. Since then 10 houses have been built and many more are expected. Habitat For Humanity wants to promote the design in the 1500 homes they are building
2.2	Permanent Model School	Transfer of Knowledge and Materials. Design of Open Source Manual	Got government approval for the construction. First of its kind, where earth and bamboo is approved for a public building. Three models schools already completed. Partners followed suit in other regions of Kavre, Nuwakot and Sindhupalchok so far 14 more classroom blocks have been built elsewhere. Trained over 100 people in the process	The design and the construction techniques have been very successful. People are already emulating the construction skills in their homes. Already 10 are under construction. And the school designs have already replicated in other parts of Kavre, Nuwakot and Sindhupalchok.

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Table 11: Comparison of unit cost of different intervention

SN	Key activities	Basic features/elements of Abari supported	Unit cost of Abari (in NPR)	Basic features/elements of Government supported houses	Unit cost of Government Supported Houses (in NPR)	Basic features/elements of Caritas supported	Unit cost of Caritas(in NPR)
1.2	Transitional school	Made with locally available material	Rs. 30,000	Uses metal trusses and CGI sheets.	Rs. 40,000	Uses metal trusses and CGI sheets.	Rs. 40,000

		Giving skills rather than materials. Uses Canvas and bamboo, which is thermal comfortable and can be made locally. It is economical to build.		When bamboo is used, it is not treated. Cheap and quick to build.		Poor thermal performance.	
1.3	Transitional Shelter	Giving skills rather than materials. Harnesses local materials like bamboo, wood other local materials,	Rs. 45000	Uses metal trusses and tin sheets. Poor thermal performance.	Rs. 60000	Uses metal trusses and tin sheets. Poor thermal performance.	Rs. 60000
2.1	Permanent Home	Uses local materials. Empowers local's skills. Bricks made with local earth. Roofs made with bamboo. Most of the cost stays locally. Builds on traditional skills. Thermally comfortable.	Rs. 800000	Discourages uses of local materials. Excessive use of cements and foreign materials.	Rs. 120,000	Discourages uses of local materials. Excessive use of cements and foreign materials.	Rs. 120,000
2.2	Permanent Model School	Uses local materials. Empowers local's skills. Bricks made with local earth. Roofs made with bamboo. Most of the cost stays locally. Builds on traditional skills. Thermally comfortable.	Rs. 3,500,000	Excessive use of foreign materials. No consideration for thermal comfort. Cost prohibitive.	Rs. 4,500,000	Excessive use of foreign materials. No consideration for thermal comfort. Cost prohibitive.	Rs. 4,500,000

Source: Field consultation, 2017

Annex-2: Expenditure status of Response and Recovery Project

Expenditure status of Avaaz funded earthquake response project (as of 30th December 2016)

SN	Key activities	Approved budget (in USD)	Expenditure (in USD)
1	Relief material	14001	13259
2	Transitional schools	77256	76560
3	Demonstration permanent home	22211	23568
4	Transitional shelter	20400	20710
5	Tools	4244	4456
6	Travel cost	3407	3332
7	Repair and maintenance	714	388
8	Printing and stationeries	1825	1757
9	Admin cost	8377	8405
	Total	152435	152435

Source: Abari's record, 2017

Combination of Audit report, Abari's own records, bank statements, field report, observation and consultation with project stakeholders confirmed that 100% of the project budget for the response phase was utilized.

Expenditure status of Avaaz funded earthquake recovery project (as of 15th January 2017)

SN	Key activities	Approved budget (USD)	Expenditure (USD)
1	Construction materials cost for 3 schools	80122	79677
2	Wages and training cost	38509	39399
3	Salaries	34500	33399
4	Food and accommodation for trainees	1440	1440
5	Fuel	400	400
6	Miscellaneous	143	143
7	Rent	2667	2667
8	Travel cost	2504	2604
9	Furniture and fixtures for schools	31825	32381
	Total	192110	192110

Source: Abari's record, 2017

Combination of Audit report, Abari's own records, bank statements, field report, observation and consultation with project stakeholders confirmed that about 95% project budget has been utilized for the recovery phase thus far. The deadline for complete utilization of the funds was extended to February 28, 2017.

Annex 3: Breakdown of expenses for permanent school/home and transitional shelter/home

Breakdown of expenses for permanent school

S.n	Description	Amount (in NPR)	Amount (in USD)
1	Bamboo	5,00,000	4762
2	Hardware goods	14,29,273	13,612
3	Soil and sand	5,55,000	5285
4	Wages	9,48,775	9035
	Total	34,33,048	32,694

Source: Abari's records, 2017

Note:- Bills for all the expenses made is available and attached in annex-5, the bill for bamboo attached is of Rs 16,00,000 out of which only the bamboo of Rs 5,00,000 is used for this school.

Breakdown of expenses for permanent home

S.n	Description	Amount (in NPR)	Amount (in USD)
1	Bamboo	3,00,000	2857
2	Hardware goods	10,83,095	10315
3	Wages	7,30,495	6957
	Total	21,13,590	20129

Source: Abari's records, 2017

Note:- Bills for all the expenses are available and attached in the annex-5 except for the bamboo. Bamboo was purchased with the individual so no bill was available but Abari had a MOU with the supplier. On the basis of MOU, payment was made to supplier through account payee cheque.

Breakdown of expenses for transitional shelter and school

S.n	Description	Amount (in NPR)	Amount (in USD)
1	Bamboo	60,000	571
2	Hardware goods	83,703	797
3	Wages	31,000	295
	Total	1,74,703	1663

Source: Abari's records, 2017


Note:- Bills cover expenses of both temporary shelter and school. All for all expenses made is available. Bamboo was purchased with the individual so no bill was available but Abari had a MOU with the supplier. On the basis of MOU, payment was made to supplier through account payee cheque.

Annex 4: Latest photographs of three schools

Saraswoti Secondary School, Kavre



Building features



Building features



Bird-eye view from south side



Consultation with SMC members

Jana Jyoti Primary School, Kavre



Construction is in progress



Focus group discussion with SMC and PTA



Interaction with SMC members

Model house at Bhattedanda, Kavre (Sanu Maya's Home)



Photographs of permanent model home










Community consultations




Annex-5: Sampled bills that tallied during field work

I. Bills related to Saraswoti Secondary School, Kavre


 <p>Bill no ① NPR 60,800</p> <p>Bill no ② NPR 314943</p>	 <p>Bill no ③ NPR 305000</p> <p>Bill no ④ NPR 60000</p>	 <p>Bill no ⑤ NPR 110000</p> <p>Bill no ⑥ NPR 55000</p>
<p>1. Cement 2. Grender Pipes 3. 12mm rod 4. Rods and others</p>	<p>1. Earth (soil) 2. Gravels 3. Sand 4. Earth</p>	<p>1. Stone 2. Earth</p>
 <p>Bill no ⑦ NPR 87954</p> <p>Bill no ⑧ NPR 3285428</p>	 <p>Bill no ⑨ NPR 50000</p> <p>Bill no ⑩ NPR 32485</p>	 <p>Bill no ⑪ NPR 4724</p> <p>Bill no ⑫ NPR 334128</p>
<p>1. Rod,Nut 2. Wires, Cement 3. Hardware 4. Hardware</p>	<p>1. Bamboo 2. Plywood 3. A2 grade filin 4. Thread Rod</p>	<p>1. Metals 2. 8 mm rod etc 3. Cement 4. Metal</p>



1. Iron & cement 2. Hardware 3. Black Roll 4. Concreting plastic	1. White Cement 2. Inamel etc 3. Kailaso 4. P-sheet 269	1. Plywood 2. Mini eiller 3. Hardware 4. Sand
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
A grade filler/face



Wages to unskilled labour


2. Bill related to temporary shelter construction

<p>Abani Bamboo and Earth Initiative PAYMENT SLIP Date: 20/07/2023 Amount: NPR 60000</p>	<p>Bill no. 1: NPR 340 Bill no. 2: NPR 4200</p>	<p>Bill no. 3: NPR 8834 Bill no. 4: NPR 4205</p>
<p>17. Bamboo</p>	<p>1) Rod 2) Foam</p>	<p>1) Mis sit 2) Hardware materials</p>
<p>Bill no. 5: NPR 2230 Bill no. 6: NPR 2049</p>	<p>Bill no. 7: NPR 5999 Bill no. 8: NPR 22204</p>	<p>Bill no. 9: NPR 2600 Bill no. 10: NPR 35000</p>
<p>1. 19mm Black foard 2. Hardare</p>	<p>1) Grinder 2) Concreting cover</p>	<p>1) Wages 2) Wages</p>



1) Pipe 2) Plywood


3. Bill related to construction of permanent house




1) Glass Black 2) Cement
3) Hardware 4) Pipe



1) ½ JI 2) Stones
3) Pipe 4) Plywood



1) S/L connected division 2) Rod
3) Rifer 25mm 4) Hilty hit



1) Bit 8m 2) Light etc

1) Makita hammer 2) Sand
3) Sand 4) 3.5mm clear glass

1) Fuel 2) Bukiya
3) Stationery 4) Food



1) Pipe etc 2) Ranbow
3) Plywood 4) 5mm Mis



1) Kailaso 500 CTM 2) Black Pipe
3) Shera square 4) Edge Board




1) Rod 2) Sq 2''*2mm
3) Grinder 4) G.I Wire



1) Grender 2) Medical
3) Wire 4) Fuel



1) Food 2) Food
3) Fuel 3) Water



1) Glass 2) Rod
3) Grinder



Bamboo



Wages

